DICTA BLANDA

POLITICS, WORK, AND CULTURE IN MEXICO, 1938–1968

PAUL GILLINGHAM
and
BENJAMIN T. SMITH, editors
DICTABLANDA
AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS/GLOBAL INTERACTIONS
A series edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Emily S. Rosenberg
This series aims to stimulate critical perspectives and fresh interpretive frameworks for scholarship on the history of the imposing global presence of the United States. Its primary concerns include the deployment and contestation of power, the construction and deconstruction of cultural and political borders, the fluid meanings of intercultural encounters, and the complex interplay between the global and the local. American Encounters seeks to strengthen dialogue and collaboration between historians of U.S. international relations and area studies specialists.

The series encourages scholarship based on multiarchival historical research. At the same time, it supports a recognition of the representational character of all stories about the past and promotes critical inquiry into issues of subjectivity and narrative. In the process, American Encounters strives to understand the context in which meanings related to nations, cultures, and political economy are continually produced, challenged, and reshaped.
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This book is about power in a place beyond dichotomies of democracy or dictatorship, namely modern Mexico. The authors come from distinct disciplines and different historiographical traditions, have diverse research interests, and were brought together without any single theoretical diktat. It was in part the very breadth of interests and approaches that suggested their incorporation, in a deliberate search for academic biodiversity. We encouraged disagreement. This approach to collaborative work has been dubbed a dog’s breakfast.\textsuperscript{1} We hoped instead for a cat’s cradle: a skein of threads that, when drawn tight, might reveal a pattern.

Initially the only evident common factor was a shared curiosity in the no man’s land of historicizing power in the mid-century, those three decades between 1938 and 1968 when dominant party rule coalesced and peaked. A preference for controlled eclecticism over theoretical monoculture did not, however, mean the absence of a framework.\textsuperscript{2} We sought contributors whose work fell into one of three broad categories: high and low politics; work and resource regulation; and culture and ideology. These thematic choices presupposed an organizing concept: that the relations between rulers and ruled were characterized by authoritarianism, competitive politics, and resistance, making Mexico an early variant of a dictablanda, a hybrid regime that combines democratic and authoritarian elements; and that such hybrid regimes are profoundly complex, dynamic, and ambiguous, demanding heterodox approaches.\textsuperscript{3} They reflected a debt to those scholars who have made empirical cases for the ability of everyday subjects to resist the projects of the powerful, shaping their lives in constant haggling with authority; for the state as a masque; and for the causal significance of popular culture in determining dynamic political outcomes.\textsuperscript{4} They also reflected the proposition that this was not the whole story.\textsuperscript{5}
We posited that cultural and materialist explanations were not so much dichotomous as complementary and that struggles for power encompassed additional phenomena. Some were previously hidden. Cumulative case studies and once-unobtainable sources, notably declassified intelligence, revealed the underestimated violence deployed by both rulers and ruled; the related salience of popular political inputs; the enduringly central role of petty authoritarianism, also known as caciquismo; and the way that local autonomies and a fragmented public sphere—“many Mexicos”—might strengthen rather than weaken central power. Other phenomena were more obvious and as such might be undervalued by the seductive episteme of the hidden. They should not be: laws, institutions, and budgets were more than façades under which deeper causal mechanisms lurked. Moreover, the importance of an economic model that overtly privileged towns at the expense of countryside was unmissable. Finally—and critically—we were struck by the ubiquitous phenomenon of actors who shifted fluently along a spectrum of resistance to, tolerance of, and alliance with the state.

The resulting framework identifies three arenas of power: the political, the material, and the cultural. It conceptualizes power as the ability to do things, to get other people to do things, and/or to stop other people from doing things. This draws on two resistance-centric definitions: that of Max Weber, who deemed power an actor’s capacity “to carry out his will despite resistance,” and George Tsebelis’s idea of veto players, those “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo.” In between the extreme outcomes of imposition or veto lies negotiation, in itself both a process and an outcome: a statement of a balance, albeit skewed, of power.

Negotiation was central to rule in Mexico, but that does not imply the pre-eminence of a consent-based cultural hegemony because negotiation in hybrid regimes involves violence past, violence present, and the fear of violence in the future. This is incompatible with one type of Gramscian hegemony, which opposes hegemony to “authority” and “dictatorship,” quarantines it from violence, and stresses instead its consensual core. It is compatible with Gramsci’s alternative idea of hegemony as the balance (or “dual perspective” or “dialectical unity”) of “force and consent,” which, when effective, establishes a “compromise equilibrium” between rulers and ruled. Yet advancing this is (as Michael Taussig observed regarding social construction) “nothing more than an invitation, a preamble to investigation,” rather than a conclusion. As Kate Crehan suggests, “rather than being a precisely bounded theoretical concept, hegemony for Gramsci simply names the problem—that of how the power relations underpinning various forms of inequality are produced and reproduced—that he is interested in exploring. What in any given
context constitutes hegemony can only be discovered through careful empirical analysis.” The question is not whether Mexican elites achieved stability, however rudimentary, on a national level through a balance of force and consent; they did. The questions, rather, are where that balance fell, how it was struck, and how it swayed from time to time and from place to place.

We discuss these questions in specific terms in the introduction. In general terms, gauging answers to those questions involves all three arenas of power: the political, the material, and the cultural. There is no single independent variable that provides a comprehensive explanation for the processes of state formation and its outcome. The three are, rather, tightly interwoven. For example, the political function of any state’s management of economic resources is coalition-building, but in Mexico, at all levels, those resources were leveraged by a cultural phenomenon: the pervasive revolutionary rhetoric that gave the excluded some hope of joining such coalitions in the future. Revolutionary nationalism did provide something of a common language for both hegemonies and counter-hegemonies, but that language was underpinned by violence. Everyday people were coerced into nationalist ceremonies by the threats of fines or jailing; archaeological artifacts were appropriated by platoons of soldiers despite village protests; journalists and Catholic militants, or agraristas and teachers, could face beatings or assassination. Bribery—lunches for marches—was also salient. Moreover, rulers and ruled were polyglot, and in addition to the common language of revolutionary nationalism (which some refused to speak) there were other common languages that were tactically adopted as political mores shifted, such as the rhetorics of democracy and development. To see economic processes at work shaping culture, cultural forces shaping economies, and politics—both formal and informal—at the intersection of the two; to posit that causal primacy varies from case to case, when it can be pinned down at all; and to note a high prevalence of equifinality—different processes leading to similar outcomes—is not a “live-and-let-live” conceptual mush. It is a reasonable reflection of the case studies we have.

Mexican historiography is highly dependent on case studies for the obvious epistemological reasons of a large and diverse territory and population. This should not shut the door on systematic comparison both across and beyond Latin America. Deviant case studies, exploring the exceptions that test the rule, can revise broad generalizations, as regional histories of revolution demonstrated. Most likely (those where a theory should if anywhere work), least likely (those that should lie beyond the limits of a theory), and crucial case studies can test, extend, and even suggest theories. These may be less grand and more middle-range: universal but comparatively narrow proposals of social processes founded on the concrete, the specific, and the
time-sensitive. Yet such generalizations are particularly apt for Mexico in
the mid-century, with its neither-fish-nor-fowl relationships of power. As
Fernando Coronil observed, “fragmentation, ambiguity, and disjunctions are
features of complex systems”; in Mexico and other hybrid regimes the frag-
mentation and the ambiguity are not just down to complexity but also form
part of the ruling class’s strategies of domination: divide, confuse, and rule.
The limitations of methodology are, in other words, perhaps less limiting in
Mexico than elsewhere. At the same time history’s strengths— broad and
deep empiricism, the explanatory richness that creates, and a sophisticated
appreciation of the diverse rhythms and causal effects of time— might allow
historians of Mexico to advance more universal discussions.

It is difficult (but not impossible) to generalize about the frequency of the
processes of domination and resistance that studies in this field are starting
to trace. But in identifying and tracing the multiplicity of those processes,
combining case studies, qualitative overviews, and basic cliometrics, we
might come up with a coherent model of mid-century Mexico. That model is
neither of a system based on consensual cultural hegemony nor one of Al-
thusser’s Repressive State Apparatuses, such as bureaucratic authoritarian-
ism. The essays in this book argue that force was real, strategically applied,
and successfully masked. It also was exercised by both rulers and ruled. It
went hand in hand with a certain degree of consent: one produced by eco-
nomic growth and a coalition-building distribution of resources, by politi-
cal accommodation, and by culture. The outcome was not stasis but rather
something like a chemist’s dynamic equilibrium, in which reactions move
in opposite directions at broadly similar speeds.

This can be described by the term dictablanda: the combination of dictadura
dictatorship) with the switch of dura (hard) for bland (soft). This has, as Jeff-
rey Rubin argues, a powerful, untranslatable resonance. It also enjoys a rec-
ord of some usage inside Mexico, bypassing the more misleading labels of
the democracy with adjectives, the perfect dictatorship, or even the PRISTA
state. Dictablanda, in both popular and general terms, is good to think for
mid-century Mexico. In comparative terms, however, Guillermo O’Donnell
and Philip Schmitter’s definition, which denotes liberalizing authoritarian
regimes, without elections, in transition, suggests the need for translation,
for a parallel, more precise, and broadly understood category. Translating
the dictablanda seems particularly relevant given that Mexico shared some
aspects of old Latin American authoritarian states while foreshadowing
the post–Cold War genus of hybrid regimes, species of which encompass
between a quarter and a third of all contemporary states. In our period Mex-
ico was in many ways a competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian
regime “in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed
as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.\textsuperscript{23} Some of the characteristics behind the Mexican regime’s resilience—the institutionalized circulation of national elites within a single party, a powerful national story, and a deliberately fragmented public sphere, the negotiated nature of rule, the hidden violence, the local electoral contests—might interest political scientists who apply this historically contingent theory to places like contemporary Malaysia, Russia, or Tanzania, extending its ambit beyond the electoral and the elite toward a model of power that is simultaneously comprehensive and disaggregated, one that gives full play to the local and the informal and the cultural: soft authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{24}

Notes


6. While, as David Nugent points out, “It is a curious fact that neither of the two approaches to the state that currently inform academic debate—the organizational nor the representational—has had much to say to each other,” scholars have long indicated the potential of such dialogues. David Nugent, “Conclusion: Reflections on State Theory Through the Lens of the Mexican Military,” in Forced Marches: Soldiers and


12. An analysis that fully recognizes Gramsci’s “intense concern with the materiality of power”; a concern that, Crehan argues, has been largely lost in anthropologists’ usage. Kate Crehan, Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 104, 172–76.


15. Important works include Luis González y González, Pueblo en vilo (Mexico City: SEP, 1984); Heather Fowler-Salamini, Agrarian radicalism in Veracruz, 1920–38 (Lincoln:


20. The term was coined to describe Spanish politics under General Berenguer during the 1930s and subsequently applied to the last years of the Franco regime. By the 1950s it had been adopted by Mexican intellectuals to describe first the Porfirian and later the priísta state. It lay at the heart of the stormy exchange between Octavio Paz, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Enrique Krauze of 1990s televised “Encuentro Vuelta,” in which Vargas Llosa dubbed modern Mexico the “perfect dictatorship,” Paz reacted furiously, and Krauze suggested the compromise of dictablanda. (Paz abruptly cancelled the ensuing round table; Vargas Llosa left the country adducing “family reasons.”) William D. Phillips, Carla Rahn Phillips, A Concise History of Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 246; Daniel Cosío Villegas quoted in Enrique Krauze, Místico de la autoridad: Porfirio Díaz (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), 34; Xavier Rodríguez Ledesma, El pensamiento político de Octavio Paz: Las trampas de la ideología (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 1996), 414–18.


24. There are several extant types of what might be called authoritarianism with adjectives. While cautious to introduce one more, we think it is useful in this instance to think as splitters rather than lumpers: hegemonic party autocracies, for example, are generally thought of as noncompetitive, whereas competitive authoritarianism does not capture the distinct origins and multiple strategies of domination that characterize mid-century Mexico. Neither does Tocqueville’s concept of “soft despotism,”
This book grew out of a series of panels that led in turn to a two-day international conference at Michigan State University in 2009. We would like to thank all the departments and individuals who generously supported that conference, in particular Mark Kornbluh, Dylan Miner, Elizabeth O’Brien, Antonio Turok, Lapiztola, Zzierra Rrezza, and Edith Morales Sánchez, together with the Department of History, the Residential College in the Arts and Humanities, the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, the Department of Political Science, the School of Journalism, and the School of Criminal Justice. For the next step of turning the resulting papers into a book we owe warm thanks to Gil Joseph and to Valerie Milholland and Gisela Fosado at Duke University Press, whose backing for this project has been patient and considerable.

We have incurred substantial professional and personal debts along the way—substantial enough, when combined with those of our contributors, to defy detailed listing. The archivists, librarians, interviewees, students, colleagues, and friends who helped us along the way have been fundamental to our work; they know who they are, and how grateful we are to them. Our authors have been much put upon and have responded with tolerance and multiple drafts. Other colleagues have contributed as commentators and critical readers. Heather Fowler-Salamini, Alan Knight, Pablo Piccato, and John Womack Jr. were the original discussants at Michigan State University; they went on to read drafts of the manuscript and make valuable observations and suggestions a second time around, to which Oscar Altamirano, Chris Boyer, Barry Carr, Ben Fallaw, Maria Teresa Fernández Aceves, Gladys McCormick, Tanalis Padilla, Wil Pansters, Andrew Paxman, Eric Van Young, and Duke’s anonymous readers subsequently added. John Womack Jr. asked some difficult—and consequently useful—questions, which we greatly appreciated.
Above all we would like to thank Jolie Olcott and Jeffrey Rubin for their incisive readings of this book, which have significantly shaped its final form.

Finally we would like to thank our families, in particular our wives, who contributed in ways ranging from interviews and translations to technology and contracts.
### Glossary of Institutions and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Department</td>
<td>Departamento Agraria (1934–1960); Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización (1960–1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>Procurador General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento (1917–1946); Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (1946–1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health and Social Security</td>
<td>Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Interior</td>
<td>Secretaría de Gobernación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Works</td>
<td>Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (1920–1959); Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (1959–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Security Directorate</td>
<td>Dirección Federal de Seguridad, (DFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Directorate of Political and Social Investigations</td>
<td>Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (IPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the State Prosecutor</td>
<td>Ministerio Público</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Secretaría de Hacienda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGN</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Nación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPEO</td>
<td>Archivo General del Poder Ejecutivo del Estado de Oaxaca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHEV</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico del Estado de Veracruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHSDN</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Defensa National</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALM</td>
<td>Adolfo López Mateos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI</td>
<td>Archivo Municipal de Ixcateopan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCCG</td>
<td>Biblioteca Carmen Castañeda García</td>
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<td>CMGUF</td>
<td>Colección María Guadalupe Urzúa Flores</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNCA</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNTE</td>
<td>Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Confederación de Trabajadores de México</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Dirección Federal de Seguridad</td>
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<td>DGG</td>
<td>Dirección General de Gobierno</td>
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<td>DGIPS</td>
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<td>FCE</td>
<td>Fondo Cultura Económica</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLACSO</td>
<td>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>National Archives, Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILAS</td>
<td>Institute of Latin American Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAH</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPN</td>
<td>Instituto Politécnico Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Presidentes, Lázaro Cardenas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>Liga de Comunidades Agrarias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Manuel Ávila Camacho</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAV</td>
<td>Miguel Alemán Valdés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDRF</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Division Regional Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRM</td>
<td>Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARG</td>
<td>National Archives Record Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONIR</td>
<td>Obra Nacional de Instrucción Religiosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partido Acción Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Mexicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Institutional Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Partido de la Revolución Mexicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Records Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Secretaría de Defensa Nacional</td>
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<td>SEP</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Revolutions have unintended consequences. In 1910 Mexicans rebelled against an imperfect dictatorship; after 1940 they ended up with what some called the perfect dictatorship.\(^1\) Mexico was ruled by a single—admittedly mutation-prone—party from 1929 to 2000, a record of longevity surpassed only by Liberia’s True Whig Party (1878–1980), the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (1921–1996), and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1917–1989).\(^2\) While everyday people and scholars debated the details of this long-running regime, a compelling story survived the passing of time, governments, and scholarly fashions. This metanarrative held that the revolution had evolved from violent popular upheaval to sweeping social reform in the 1930s. Mexico’s new rulers of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional—the PRI—had with that reform signed a revolutionary social contract to reestablish central control.\(^3\) Peasants traded in their radicalism for land grants; a diverse labor movement mutated into a monolithic servant of government. The new state delivered economic growth, political stability, and a discourse—partially fulfilled—of social justice. The years between 1940 and 1968 were consequently a golden age.\(^4\) History, in the pejorative sense of one damn thing after another, ended in 1940.

Yet this vision of a thirty-year pax priísta doesn’t add up: it “drops history out at every turn.”\(^5\) Numerous studies of the revolutionary period have demonstrated that Mexico was nowhere near this sort of synchronic stability in 1940. The state that emerged from Cárdenas’s agrarian, labor, and educational reforms was inchoate and often ineffective. The political class remained fragmented, a “loose, heterogeneous, and shifting coalition” of radicals, reformers, moderates,
opportunists, and veiled reactionaries. The party’s peasant corporatist bloc—still supposed to represent (and control) a majority of the population—was an umbrella organization of little practical import. Vigorous electoral competition endured, particularly in the provinces; managing the 1940 presidential election required a massacre in the capital. Mexico’s state apparatus remained underfunded, understaffed, and ill-informed. Although social spending increased, bureaucrats complained that they lacked the competent agronomists, teachers, and indigenous advocates to implement central policies. Socialist education failed, Cárdenas concluded, not just through conservative opposition but also because “the Secretaría de Educación Pública didn’t have enough socialist teachers.” Furthermore, political factions cannibalized critical government agencies, reorienting them to serve local and rent-seeking goals. Popular groups, from the Mayo and Tarahumara in the north, to the Sinarquistas of the Bajío, to the Zapotecs and Triquis of Oaxaca, resisted state integration. And economic elites—ranging from rural ruffians like Manuel Parra to industrial heavyweights like the Monterrey group—used “the weapons of the strong” to press for the reversal of state reforms.

Cárdenas’s failure to construct a corporatist Rechtsstaat casts doubt on prevailing interpretations of the succeeding decades and leaves the historian with two paradoxes. There is the paradox of revolution: how did millions of Mexicans who made anarchic popular revolution end up as apparently peaceable subjects in the world’s most successful authoritarian state? And there is the further paradox of state capitalism. Transitions from revolution to authoritarianism are relatively commonplace; France, Russia, China, and England all underwent similar shifts. Simultaneous, drastic shifts toward highly inequitable economic models are less common. Mexico is extraordinary in that a revolutionary movement, which experimented with collectivist and even socialist modes of production, led to such a deeply inequitable capitalist regime. Mexico experienced strong economic growth across the period: gross domestic product rose at an average rate of 6.4 percent and manufacturing output 8.2 percent per annum. Agricultural production more than trebled. Yet urban real wages declined, only regaining 1940 levels in 1967, and rural wages fell 40 percent. Wage earners, moreover, were not the hardest hit: peasant household income was statistically “not just insufficient but ridiculous.” Government policies of retrenched per capita social spending and effectively regressive taxation further increased inequality. In comparative terms, Mexico’s Gini coefficient, a compound measure of national inequality in the distribution of wealth, averaged 0.55 between 1950 and 1968. By the end of the 1960s it had risen to 0.58. This outstripped every other Latin American country bar Honduras and Brazil, and was only comparable, outside the region, with the economies of sub-Saharan Africa; the countries of
postcolonial Asia and North Africa all developed significantly more equitable economies in this period (see table I.1). Even after the populist reforms of the 1970s a marked inequality endured, and nutritionists estimated that nearly a third of the population suffered severe malnutrition. Behind up-beat stories of Mexico’s extraordinary political and economic models lay a more complicated reality—one masked, relatively successfully, by the cultural managers of the state.

Mechanical Metaphors, Messy Realities

The success story of the “revolution made government” was written by Mexican politicians, “official” historians, and social scientists such as Frank Brandenburg, whose influential work was dedicated to “the visionaries of the Revolutionary Family.” It was not unanimously accepted in Mexico, where people across classes, regions, and ideologies bitterly criticized the postrevolutionary state. Politicians struggled under the fire of what James Scott called “the weapons of the weak”: gossip, slurs, satirical songs, black jokes, and other means of character assassination. Discourse deemed them “vampires”; when President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines flickered across a cinema screen his gigantic image met with cries of “Dracula!” From joke to threat was no big step. A peasant told his village treasurer that he “was a whoreson just like the other municipal authorities and very soon they’d get fucked up.” Even the president was not immune to the subversive violence of gossip. In 1948 a spy inside the miners’ union reported one worker saying “that the President of

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TABLE I.1. Income Inequality in Mexico and Nine Comparatives, 1968–1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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the Republic and the bunch of bandits who surround him were to blame [for the economic crisis], that they were sick of it and should exercise direct action against the Government, and that Chapultepec woods had lots of fine trees to go and hang every last one of them.” The listeners laughed, perhaps a bit nervously. They might also have laughed at Abel Quezada’s cartoons, in which bandolier-festooned revolutionaries sliced golf shots, or new elites wore diamonds on their noses and sported names like Gastón Billetes. In the theaters and cinemas they could see comedians like Cantinflas or Palillo flirting with similar dissidence or hear Rodolfo Usigli’s bitter denunciations of revolutionary cant. If they read Carlos Fuentes or Mariano Azuela they could be shocked by the cynical intermarriages of pre- and postrevolutionary elites, knowing exchanges skewered as “give me class and I’ll give you cash.” The government could restrain popular revisionism, but it could not end it.

Across the mid-century, historians including Daniel Cosío Villegas, Jesús Silva Herzog, Jorge Vera Españañol, and Moisés González Navarro all imported some of that popular revisionism into the early historiography of the revolution. Others subsequently reconstructed some of the tricky juggling acts underlying elite endurance in power. Yet these were exceptions, and until recently most historians ignored the period after 1940, leaving interpretation to anthropologists, sociologists, and, above all, political scientists. The latter’s models of state/society relations were ambiguous from the start: was Mexico a democracy or a dictatorship? Such incertitude was exemplified in Brandenburg’s work, which evolved in the late 1950s from considering Mexico a “one-party democracy” to concluding that it was a “liberal authoritarian” system. As the 1960s ended—with the landmark student massacre at Tlatelolco and without alternation in power—uncertainties dwindled. By the 1970s broad consensus held that Mexico was an authoritarian state, where a powerful corporatist party exercised tight social control through its three class-defined subentities, which marshaled peasants, workers, and the middle classes in massive support, part coerced and part founded on the social compact of revolutionary reform. And Mexico was a hyper-presidentialist state in which a single man and his coterie monopolized national power.

These interpretations and their everyday counterparts drew heavily on mechanical metaphors: the country was run by el sistema, la maquinaria oficial, the party machine, “a political solar system,” in which Mexicans “rotated around the presidential sun and his electoral machinery.” Less mechanical metaphors were similarly sweeping: Mexico was, commonplace held, a Leviathan state. Its immediate past, particularly in the época de oro before 1968, was one of static and uncontested domination over an apathetic people. Such ideas were not wholly to the distaste of Mexican elites: the PRI elite’s “image of invincibility” was a key tool for survival. Across the period both
sympathetic and skeptical analyses centered on these two assumptions: that
the postrevolutionary state was powerful, dominating a largely unresisting
population, and as a consequence was—by the standards of both the Mexi-
can past and the Latin American present—exceptionally stable.

Such assumptions begged clear questions of class conflict and resistance:
how had the state either hidden or bypassed them? These interpretive prob-
lems led historians to reconsider state formation from a cultural perspective,
embracing the poststructuralist textual analyses and anthropology-inflected
works of European cultural historians. In doing so, they challenged “reified”
Marxist or Weberian examinations of the state “as a material object of study,”
preferring Philip Abrams’s interpretation of the state as an “a-historical mask
of legitimating illusion.”37 In the most influential formulation of this shift,
Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent leaned selectively on the work of Derek
Sayer and Philip Corrigan to argue that the state’s power derived not from
its laws, its institutions, its armed forces, or even its broad capitalist under-
pinnings, but rather from “the centuries-long cultural process which was
embodied in the forms, routines, rituals, and discourses of rule.”38 As state
formation was “nothing less than a cultural ‘revolution,’” it was festivals,
comic books, education programs, and murals—rather than parties, bureau-
cracies, or systems of land tenure—that created the modern Mexican state.39

At the same time, historians drew on the insights of subaltern studies the-
orists to investigate the relationship between these state-building efforts and
popular culture, arguing that peasants neither blithely accepted nor bitterly
rejected revolutionary cultural shifts.40 Instead, they argued that country
people tactically negotiated, appropriated, and reformulated state discourses
and rituals. Eliding cultural interpretations of the state and a sophisticated
conception of popular responses, scholars concluded that this hegemonic
process of appropriation and negotiation produced “a common material and
meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon
social orders characterized by domination” and that this framework under-
pinned the postrevolutionary state’s endurance.41 It was neither “a shared
ideology” nor a low-rent “false consciousness” but rather a shared language
that led to a consensus on the cultural bases for (and scope of) political
action.42

This approach had several advantages. In analytical terms it reestablished
the sheer messiness of reality, meshing neatly with studies of caciquismo.43 It
stressed that resistance existed in everyday forms, outside of set-piece bat-
tles, and argued cogently for its impact. In so doing it unearthed multiple
examples of popular inputs to state formation, corrected earlier concepts of
popular passivity, and continued social historians’ traditional appreciation of
the difficulty and complexity of achieving order. It furthered Nora Hamilton’s
PAUL GILLINGHAM AND BENJAMIN T. SMITH

pathfinding analysis, lowering estimates of elite autonomy and stressing the flimsiness of central power. Finally, it argued that hegemonic discourses over revolution, nation, and gender both subsumed and were shaped by counter-hegemonic voices, a process that channeled resistance and hence, ironically enough, helped to explain the state's apparent stability.

Yet employing cultural hegemony as an exclusive framework for understanding PRIista dominance also has constraints because reality is complicated in conceptual terms as well. Reducing the state to a “mask” and the process of state formation to a cultural revolution or a series of discursive acts can promulgate a model of the state as one-dimensional as earlier reifications. As Mary Kay Vaughan observed, the new cultural history requires “those practicing it [to] combine culturalist approaches with continued attention to economic processes and to layers of political power.” Festivals, rituals, state narratives, and discourses did all play fundamental roles in distorting visions of the state, shaping popular opinion and elite policy, and generating some consensus. But contrary to Abram’s original formulation, which works best as constructive challenge rather than stand-alone theory, the state—for all its flaws—did exist as a “social fact”; the state, to paraphrase Alan Knight, had weight. It was a series of political-bureaucratic institutions with dedicated personnel who developed an array of distinct interests, preferences, and capacities. Some of those bureaucratic institutions—the Banco de México, the Secretaría de Hacienda, the Departamento Agrario—were considerably more Weberian than others, such as the Secretaría de Comunicaciones e Obras Públicas or the Departamento General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales. The state both reflected and regulated economic relations. While it was never a simple instrument of bourgeois rule, as tax collector, investor, and policy-maker it formed what Bob Jessop terms a “social relation”; not just a product, but also a generator of various class strategies. Revolutionary nationalism may have mitigated the political impact of growing inequality, but state fiscal and economic policy bankrupted peasants, impoverished the urban poor, and benefited the rich. Circuses were important; so too was bread; and so too were guns.

The rapidly expanding historiography of the last decade or so tacitly reflects this realization. There are four principal themes that have drawn historically minded Mexicanists to this period, namely national and elite politics, popular politics and violence, religion and the right, and culture. The study of elites spans individuals; camarillas, such as the Grupo Atlacomulco; critical analyses of (long-overlooked) institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Secretaría de Hacienda; and critical conjunctures, such as the Henriquista campaign of the early 1950s and the textbook conflict of the 1960s. Building on the regional studies of Cardenismo, works on popular politics and vio-
lence comprise analyses of social movements, caciquismo, governorships, and increasingly guerrilla campaigns and state repression. Scholarship on religion and the right, which cover Sinarquismo, the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), and Protestant sects, amply demonstrates how enduring divisions over state land reform and anticlericalism shaped the succeeding decades. Finally, works on culture, from comics to Cantinflas to rock ‘n’ roll, pick apart the intimate ties between the state and the media industry and suggest the multiplicity of responses of Mexico’s new generation of cinema-going, radio-owning, record-collecting mass media consumers. Much remains to be done, and smart, hybrid works, mixing high and low politics, labor and identity, such as those of Steven Bachelor, Gabriela Soto Laveaga and Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, may show the way forward. For the moment, though, despite the recent flurry of publications, fundamental questions over sources, approaches, chronologies, and overarching frameworks remain.

Historicizing Authoritarianism: Problems and Possibilities

In looking for answers there is no shortage of data. Historians of the mid-century face a data flood: one driven by archival liberalization (and the new technology to deal with it), the possibilities of oral histories, the post-war surge of print production, and a new level of government and international agency technocratic output. Moreover, these years saw a dramatic expansion of the social sciences, and Mexico proved an area of positive fascination for both foreign and domestic scholars. Their work needs to be engaged with: it provides both irreplaceable data and analyses that fell from favor yet anticipate, in cases, our own. Merely reviewing such a body of sources is one challenge. Sorting the reliable from the unreliable is another. This is particularly the case with the two most positivist groups of sources, namely statistics and intelligence.

PRIístas relied heavily on the positivist magic of numbers. Governors claimed to have implemented imaginary land grants and built hypothetical roads; the statistical blizzards of presidential reports systematically and dramatically inflated agricultural production figures. Some sneered: the Agriculture Secretary, one journalist wrote, “knew how to make such marvellous, eloquent statistics that the hungriest, after reading them, would be full up and burping chicken.” (Forty years later the bitter jokes continued: cartoonists invented a statistics ministry called the Secretaría de Verificación Nacional del Discurso Estatal, SEVENDE for short.) But politicians were right to bet on a residual popular faith in statistics, and spies eavesdropping in cafés found that statistics claiming increased production “caused the best impression.” Historians need to beware the same trap. Quite often the state had no way of counting accurately, or it counted with a pronounced optimism. Yet a
rough-and-ready cliometrics remains valuable. Even unbelievable statistics reveal what rulers wanted the ruled to believe; they are as useful as cultural artifacts as they are useless for straightforward representation. Furthermore, grassroots or backdoor statistics—those assembled by local bean-counting or induction—can tell us what the state either didn’t want known or couldn’t itself know. Chris Boyer’s chapter, for example, estimates deforestation through the backdoor of the volume of timber transported by rail. Finally, some statistics of questionable absolute worth are of great relative worth. Pablo Piccato’s official homicide statistics do not believably reflect real murder rates (although they may well reflect the state’s systematic massaging of those rates), but they do believably indicate their long-term decline.

Mexico’s intelligence archives pose a similar mixture of problems and possibilities. They have multiple uses: spies wrestled with the same problems of the unknown provinces as historians do now, and they enjoyed the advantage of actually being there in trying to resolve them. They were given unambiguous—unfortunately, usually verbal—briefs: one inspector in San Luis Potosí was asked, “Why are there unopposed candidates? Why do they have overwhelming political power? Through the townsmen’s fear of the authorities? Through the indifference of the voting masses? For other reasons?”60 Questions like these—and some of their answers—offer insights not just into politics, but also into the federal government’s priorities and mentalité. Some of the raw data collected by agents also are useful for social, cultural, and economic history. Yet the darker corners of the PRIísta state are now in some ways too accessible, the intelligence archives one-stop shops on an archival motorway. This poses three problems. One is what psychologists call the availability heuristic: “the tendency to judge the frequency or likelihood of an event by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind.”61 Another follows Hibbert’s stricture that people who “rely excessively on information from secret sources . . . are bound to receive a distorted view of the world.”62 Finally, these agencies were marked by amateurism, clientelism, and political bias. For much of the 1940s and 1950s they remained small, ad hoc, and amateurish agencies. In 1952 the state could only spare fifteen Gobernación agents to oversee the contested federal elections throughout the country; in 1957 the staff of one service seems to have totaled all of twenty-eight agents.63 Even in police states, intelligence material demands careful contextualization, and with a handful of agents, many of whom were incompetent, Mexico was no police state.64

The host of competing voices in these and other sources demand (and enable) creative triangulation and elegant research design. Michael Snodgrass, for example, analyzes the growing subordination of miners and metalworkers in the North before shifting to rural Jalisco, where he explores one of the
rewards of union acquiescence: privileged entry to the limited good of the Bracero Program. Piccato uses an unholy mix of tabloid crime reporting and intelligence to examine murder as an optic onto—and a critical exchange with—the state. Wil Pansters’s least-likely case study selects the most notoriously cacical region of the period, San Luis Potosí, to investigate the balance of power between local actors and state representatives, reasoning that conclusions regarding popular inputs in such unpromising circumstances are generalizable across the country. Gladys McCormick’s most-likely case study of Zacatepec, one of Mexico’s largest peasant cooperatives, reasons that the processes of domination are most likely to be revealed among those who cooperated in a zone of endemic rebellion. These and other contributors move fluently from the micro to the macro and from detailed case studies to the broadest sustainable conclusions; their work shares Eric Wolf’s idea that society is “a totality of interconnected processes, and [that] inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality.”

The combination of local and national, popular and elite realities is complemented by a heterodox approach that strives to avoid cultural or economic reductionism. Some essays center on culture: Andrew Paxman’s analysis of mass media, Jaime Pensado’s tracing of student protest, and Guillermo de la Peña’s examination of indigenismo. Others seem more political or materialist: Thom Rath’s work on the military, Benjamin Smith’s analysis of the state’s fiscal impotence, or Roberto Blancarte’s overview of church/state relations. In reality these and the other authors were characterized by their explorations of the interstices of culture, economics, and politics. While Rath’s chapter demonstrates civilian governments’ continuing dependence on the military, it is equally concerned with the causal impact of a linguistic phenomenon: the mystifying discourse of demilitarization. Paxman’s enthusiasm for media production and consumption is intertwined with the institutional and business histories of culture. Snodgrass’s work on the political economy of unionized and transnational labor ends up outlining a “culture of migration”; Pansters’s history of Gonzalo N. Santos’s political reach begins by considering that literary gunman’s textual strategies. Such an integrated scholarship—studying local and national actors in tandem, blending grassroots and elite sources, considering among others linguistic, institutional, electoral, infrapolitical, and economic variables—is particularly indicated for hybrid regimes like Mexico, where neither Namierite nor subaltern approaches capture the complexities and subtle dialectics of history.

Toward a Model
Moving from different starting points, these essays add up to a working model of PRIísta Mexico. Future debates are foreshadowed in the following
chapters. Certain basic agreements also are evident. Some are not startling: restatements, rediscoveries, or refinements of earlier scholars’ work. Others are less anticipated. Taken together, they suggest that the diversity, dynamism, and contradictions of mid-century Mexico are best captured in a series of mid-range theories and an emic label: dictablanda.

Perhaps the most basic agreement (unsurprising given the predominance of historians) was that time mattered. While prior studies were dominated by more synchronic disciplines, our contributors emphasize what William Sewell Jr. calls “the temporalities of social life,” the understanding that outcomes are contingent “not only upon a wide range of other actions, trends, or events, but also upon the precise temporal sequence in which these occur.” This reveals how different social processes with diverse temporalities—from long-running trends to sudden individual decisions—affect the entire period, for the decades between 1938 and 1968 were extremely dynamic. Mexicans experienced shifts at all three levels of the annaliste concept of time, imagined as an ocean marked by the rapid movements of surface flotsam, by the tides of mid-level change, and by the deep, slow-moving currents of the longue durée. At the surface sexenios moved from left to right and, to a lesser extent, back again. The tides of growing industrialization and fluctuating control in the provinces ran fast. Finally, the period witnessed two bursts of that rarest brand of change, marked shifts in longue durée patterns. After three centuries of stability the population trebled in three decades. People flocked to the growing cities: by 1960 more Mexicans lived in cities than in the countryside. Simultaneously, in part consequently, people fundamentally reshaped their environments: whether through deforestation, irrigation canals, land grabs by squatters, or developmentalist macroprojects. Such objective shifts were complemented by shifts in subjective experiences of time. These ranged from the adoption of mechanical time—by the 1950s a majority of tenement dwellers in downtown Mexico City owned watches—to the pacifying acceleration of time that Paxman tentatively links to high consumption of mass media. They included the PRIistas’ adept management of boom and bust cycles of hope, drip-feeding Mexicans with politicians who proclaimed renewed political and social reform. This may well have delayed popular classification of the state as authoritarian, its economy inequitable, its revolution past.

Reintroducing time begs the questions of periodization, continuity, and change. Current schemes end the revolution in 1940 and the “golden age” in 1968. These traditional watersheds are here to stay, in part because they also are embedded in popular memory, products of a nostalgia that invoked (and invokes) Cardenismo as a critique of PRIismo, and the early PRI as a critique of the later PRI. In analytical terms they need to be qualified. Across the mid-
century there was no steady progression into authoritarianism but rather a series of lurches in the dynamic balance of power between rulers and ruled and a series of turning points. The “beginning of the end” of the revolution came in 1938, Knight argues; from a Church perspective, Blancarte demonstrates that it occurred even earlier. The government of the early 1940s was more tight-fisted, repressive, and conservative than its predecessor, a shift that stretched beyond peasant and labor politics to encompass phenomena as diverse as teacher training and conservation strategy.71 Pent-up political demand after the war, however, shaped the early PRI and lent electoral substance to its modish rhetoric of democracy. Both mode and substance largely died across Latin America in the late 1940s, and Mexico was no exception. The 1950 end to party primaries restricted competitive politics; 1952 proved the last threatening presidential election for thirty years72 yet also marked the end of the army’s overt meddling in presidential politics. The year 1959 saw not just the repression of the railroad workers’ strike but also a mass extinction of the biggest regional caciques,73 a purge of the army’s top regional commanders and—a year later—the nationalization of the Jenkins film monopoly.74 The early 1960s combined increasing antisystemic revolt and increasing authoritarianism with increased land grants and increased avenues for limited electoral pluralism; a modicum of proportional representation in 1963, a brief fling with primaries in 1965. Such ambiguities—a defining characteristic of a dictablanda—leave room for debate over the significance of each shift. One argument is clear and runs across several chapters: 1968 was a turning point more in perception than in reality.75 Military repression had never left the countryside and urban protests had never ended. As Pensado demonstrates, multiple pro-democracy student movements—countered with soldiers—stretched back over a decade. Imagining the golden age as a clearly bounded period is as much a function of the ideological remembering of time as of dramatic historical rupture.

The most revision-proof aspect of the golden age is macroeconomic. Between 1940 and 1970 the state implemented protectionist and investment policies designed to develop key industries and stimulate the economy. This project—Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)—generated impressive growth and one of the lowest import coefficients in Latin America. Quality of life indicators such as literacy and longevity rose alongside the economy.76 Yet the former originated in the 1930s and the latter was in part a product of global medical advances. Mid-century economic growth was quantitatively strong but qualitatively weak. Government investment channeled growth toward two sectors: manufacturing and export agriculture.77 Development also was geographically concentrated: between 1940 and 1955 more than three quarters of industrial value added occurred in the north or Mexico City.78 In
northern cities wages were more than double the national average. Yet huge swathes of the urban population remained outside the country’s explosive economic growth, forced to earn low wages in a (largely unmeasured) informal economy; urban women remained particularly marginalized. Rural workers, above all, paid the bills for ISI. Population growth was not matched with land or credit; the agrarian reform was curtailed amid accusations of congenital low productivity. The role of agriculture was to supply export crops to the north and cheap food to the cities, permitting the low urban wages that enabled industrialization. The state supported agribusiness through massive irrigation projects and tax breaks and credits, policies that—combined with price controls—undermined ejidatarios and smallholders. Between 1939 and 1947 the purchasing power of agricultural workers declined 47 percent; corn prices, adjusted for inflation, fell 33 percent between 1957 and 1973. Meanwhile fiscal policy failed to redistribute wealth from richer urban to poorer rural zones. The “Mexican miracle” presupposed, in short, a systematic transfer of resources from countryside to city and from south and center to north.

Why did peasants accept this? The second clear consensus of this volume is that many did not. Rural communities across Mexico protested vigorously and at times violently against stolen elections; against crooked politicians, tax collectors, alcohol inspectors, or forestry wardens; and against enduring poverty. Insurgencies did not begin in the 1960s: they were a constant during the earlier period. The state consequently relied on violence, exercised by pistoleros, policemen, and soldiers, far more than is traditionally appreciated. The petty undeclared counterinsurgencies of the 1940s gave way in the 1950s to repression of peasant movements linked to Henriquismo or the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (UGOCM), peaking with the crushing of the 1961 Gasca rebellion. Even—perhaps especially—petty local rebellions or jacqueries could be met with extreme, performative violence. In 1955 villagers from La Trinitaria, Chiapas, rebelled, citing high corn prices and local corruption; an army captain beheaded five of them in the main square. In 1956 Triquis from northwest Oaxaca murdered a lieutenant and two soldiers who had raped a local woman; the army called in planes to bomb the village. In 1957 soldiers in Cuaxocota, Puebla, countered plans for an ejido with beatings, mass arrests, and the threat to burn the village. This was all in the mid-1950s, generally considered to be the most peaceful stretch of the mid-century. Such unequivocal object lessons in state terror were, as one soldier told a spy, “standard (if secretive) practice.” The army was critical to rural order: in the early 1950s, Rath finds, some 20 percent of municipios held small garrisons, and conflict zones often were ruled by unelected councils headed by an officer. State violence was carefully masked—deployments
often began by night, soldiers killed while dressed as peasants—and carefully targeted. It continued the tradition of decapitating social movements by selectively killing their cadres.89

Yet there was more to violence than draconian repression, and popular violence sometimes secured popular demands. A Mexican variant of what Eric Hobsbawm dubbed collective bargaining by riot obtained, as rulers and ruled haggled through choreographed low-intensity violence, which ranged from street fights to riots to simulacra of rebellion.90 Collective bargaining by riot characterized both electoral and economic protests, and even the most radical, antisystemic mobilizations often led to concessions once they had been repressed. The 1965 guerrilla attack on an army base in Ciudad Madera, Chihuahua, led to the army hunting down and killing the attackers, but it also led to a tour of inspection by ex-president Cárdenas, which in turn generated a major redistribution of land.91 When local agrarian protests threatened to spread across regions of high-yield agricultural production the government would sometimes revive the agrarista largesse of the 1930s. In 1957 Jacinto López and the UGOCM invaded the sugar latifundias of Los Mochis, Sinaloa, and the lands of the U.S.-owned Cananea Cattle Company in Sonora, invasions that spread to the Yaqui and Mayo valleys, the Laguna, Colima, and Nayarit.92 Although soldiers arrested López, President López Mateos responded by expropriating the Cananea lands and creating seven ejidos covering a quarter of a million hectares.93 Collective bargaining by riot was time-honored practice: it was obtained in resource regulation and in the local elections, and it was salient in the PRI’s retreat from power in the 1990s.94 It applied to both policy and personnel choices, was partially protected by revolutionary rhetoric, and underlay much co-option by the state.

The main mass beneficiaries of state co-option were workers. As Kevin Middlebrook details, the state largely subordinated labor by engineering union cacicazgos between 1949 and 1951. Yet although that subordination held down real wages, it was offset by new social benefits: subsidized food staples, housing, health care, and eventually worker profit-sharing.95 As Snodgrass demonstrates, the sheer range of those benefits outweighed, in popular memory, the high costs of repression; it was—again paradoxically—a “golden age of charrismo.”96 Moreover, economic co-option stretched far beyond ownership of the means of production or benefit packages. One of the hallmarks of the period was the “dramatic expansion” of state control over the access points to a mixed economy, epitomized in legislation such as the 1950 Law on Federal Executive Powers in Economic Matters.97 Governments could buy consent by direct and indirect means; both involved rigging the competition for limited resources, broadly defined as any generator, whether tangible or intangible, of wealth. Intensive direct incentives to cooperation—state benefits,
development funding—rewarded relatively narrow sectors, above all unionized labor, bureaucrats, and soldiers. Yet government revenues were exiguous, and such benefits were perforce limited: the state had to pay market price (in cash) for the Cananea expropriation.98 As Boyer, Snodgrass, Paxman, and McCormick all show, less tangible resources were many and ranged from the natural—water, forestry, grazing—to the institutional, such as licenses for transport businesses, cantinas, television and radio stations, factories, imports and exports, street vendors, bureaucratic sinecures, or bracero permits. Government permits were ubiquitous: one cartoonist drew a policeman demanding that the three kings produce their permit to distribute Christmas presents.99 Regulating such a wide range of resources cost the state relatively little, while tactically ceding access to local, national, and export markets purchased support across classes, spanning the unemployed who got street vendors’ permits, the workers and peasants who were granted bracero permits, the middle classes who received transport concessions for taxis, buses, trucks, and drugs plazas,100 and the major industrialists who won favorable shares of national import and export quotas.101 (Permit-givers at all levels—from crony capitalist presidents like Rodríguez or Alemán down to the lowest bureaucrat—also personally profited from controlling entry to the broadest range of economic activity.) Failure to support the government could be punished by blocking that entry: Azcárraga waited a decade for his TV concession after backing Almazán.102 This regulation of resources was critical in building coalitions of consenters on the cheap because it lent Mexico one of the main advantages of a gatekeeper state: the counteracting of state weakness by the stabilizing, coalition-building tool of controlling access to capitalist markets.103

The third consensus of this book’s case studies is that rowdy mass politics never ended in the cities, where in between large-scale, set-piece confrontations and everyday forms of resistance a mid-range rumbling of dissent and mobilization persisted. During the early 1940s protests focused on the combination of spiraling food costs and ostentatious corruption.104 The harvest crisis of 1943 precipitated bread riots in Mexico City and Monterrey; two years later, dissidents blockaded downtown Xalapa to protest the price of bread.105 In the later 1940s urban grievances turned toward taxes, and social movements—some nominally attached to fly-by-night parties or unions—emerged to veto fiscal increases.106 During the 1950s and 1960s the focus of urban discontent shifted to student organizations from Puebla, Michoacán, Sonora, and San Luis Potosi.107 Throughout the period, squatter (paracaidista) organizations invaded private lands, demanded services and ejidos, and rejected state regulation. Governments were forced to respond, im-
porting grain, desperately attempting to control food prices, punishing high-taxing state officials, titling lands, and dishing out water and electricity. These measures were costly and often ineffective. Lasting alliances between the state and single-issue movements were slow to build and unreliable. It took twenty years of repeated ad hoc concessions to co-opt the market women of Oaxaca City into the official apparatus of the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP), and even then they occasionally held the government to ransom. Although Ernesto Uruchurtu built thousands of market stalls for traders, in 1966 they turned on the mayor and helped topple him when he tried to dislodge paracaidista groups. Some researchers conducting fieldwork in the 1970s observed a well-regimented party, lording it over a populace committed to “conformity to the rules rather than manipulation of them” and avoiding “violent or clearly illegal forms of political action.” Others, slightly earlier, did not: in the late 1960s, for example, Carlos Vélez-Ibañez witnessed groups of “viejas chingonas” burning down mortgage offices and throwing managers into sewage ditches in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl. Collective bargaining by riot was not confined to the countryside.

As the last example suggests, and several of our contributors demonstrate, these movements also saw women enter the political sphere with increased force. The revolution ushered in a new wave of feminists, who linked demands for voting rights with broader social claims. Some sought to work within the system, exchanging conditional loyalty for economic benefits, forming their own unions, and supporting state-linked cacicazgos. Others joined the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) and harassed the government for female suffrage from the outside. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Catholic women’s groups mobilized against government anticlericalism, especially socialist schools. Improving church-state relations, the co-option of leaders, and the political demobilization of World War II probably combined to suffocate more radical demands. But, during the succeeding decades, these left- and right-wing discourses and organizational structures percolated down to the urban and rural poor. In the process, peasants, workers, street vendors, and paracaidista housewives blended and reconfigured previously polarized ideals and redirected them toward immediate goals. In Morelos, women provided foot soldiers for Rubén Jaramillo’s radical agrarismo. In the 1940s in Oaxaca City women harnessed the organizational power of the Acción Católica Mexicana (ACM) to press the government to cut taxes and fulfill its promise of greater democracy, which they defined as having their newly granted vote actually count. By the 1960s, women also embraced the new biopolitics of fertility. Despite Catholic opprobrium,
Mexican women overwhelmingly accepted the use of contraception, which they adopted in soaring numbers across the 1970s, in some cases whether their husbands liked it or not.\textsuperscript{118}

Elites were forced to react to this new level of power and treated women as a distinct political category. They established female branches of the PRI, publicly endorsing a handful of female deputies and cacicas, and channeled social spending toward women’s organizations.\textsuperscript{119} Mexican women developed longer school careers than women in countries of comparable wealth, which translated into significantly lower infant mortality.\textsuperscript{120} The Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia concentrated its paltry funds on constructing hospitals, kindergartens, and education centers for poor working mothers.\textsuperscript{121} Throughout the country community organizers, such as Celia Ramírez, head of the Unión de Mujeres de las Colónias 20 in the Federal District, and Guadalupe Urzúa Flores, the “advocate of the outcasts” of Jalisco, gained government support.\textsuperscript{122} Offers of state largesse and political leadership brought results. As María Teresa Fernández Aceves argues, second-generation female leaders, by securing unevenly distributed social services, assured widespread female backing for the PRI after full suffrage was granted in 1952. Women could also be, as Heather Fowler-Salamini points out, caciques of much the same stripe as their male counterparts: the leaders of the Veracruz coffee sorters negotiated notable benefits for their constituents while simultaneously grafting and getting seats on the Córdoba town council.\textsuperscript{123} Some panistas brokered similar deals. Genoveva Medina, cacica of the Oaxaca City stallholders association, drafted her union into the PRI after accepting a seat in congress.\textsuperscript{124} By the mid-1950s, the growing numbers of working women, suffragettes, aspirant caciques, and militant Catholics all offered conditional support to the PRI. As a result, women voters in general, Blancarte reminds us, left PRIista fears of their generic opposition unfulfilled.

PRIista hopes for cultural engineering through education, on the other hand, generated ambiguous results. Rafael Segovia found the schoolhouse to be the main space for political discussion.\textsuperscript{125} However, the contents of many such discussions were often critical of the state. As Tanalis Padilla notes, by the 1960s “the very schools the revolutionary government had once designed to create a loyal citizenry were now producing its most militant foes.” Guerrilla leaders from Chihuahua and Guerrero were teachers; Subcomandante Marcos’s parents were maestros rurales.\textsuperscript{126} The cities were the most educated zones, where the state lavished its greatest efforts in controlling the public sphere. Yet city-dwellers seemed skeptical from the start. Café gossip was virulent and all-encompassing: presidential untouchability did not obtain over a coffee or a beer.\textsuperscript{127} That gossip translated into political opposition is clear not just in informal politics but also in election results. Unmanipulated
figures show Alemán winning a mere 59 percent in Mexico City in 1946; more manicured numbers still showed the PRI facing consistent and substantial opposition in both the center-west and north. Cultural production and reception reflected, in short, the double-edged legacy of revolutionary discourse, an instrument of both control and contestation.

Various authors question the state’s control of the public sphere and of mass media in particular. Some were overtly controlled by the government: El Nacional billed itself as “the official organ of the government” (in sales pitches pressuring town councils to subscribe). The government credit agency Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) owned 51 percent of the shares in Clasa Films Mundiales SA, which made many of the newsreels. From 1955 on there was only one television provider, TSM (later Televisa), whose owner declared the network “part of the governmental system” and the President “his boss.” Wartime censorship agencies endured, supposedly controlling everything from newsreels to comics. The censors’ work was supplemented by an array of covert control strategies that targeted the mainstream, officially pluralist press. The government used advertising contracts, soft loans, and its control of newsprint through a state monopoly supplier, PIPSA, to induce compliance. Most of the time this worked. Survey data from the 1940s to the 1970s suggest a certain core belief in the national state—in abstract—that may be causally linked to this virtual world of state-approved mass media. As Paxman argues, however, that world was not just a product of dominant party social engineering but also straightforward profit-maximizing; in ceding much control to the private sector the state also bet on the controlling effect of sheer quantity rather than on hegemonic quality alone.

Media control was also a lot more partial than generally thought. Censorship agencies enjoyed mixed results: newsreel and film censorship was dynamic and effective, while comics flourished despite the best efforts of the cultural bureaucrats. There were backdoors to effective social commentary, as Piccato’s analysis of the national crime pages demonstrates. There was a muckraking oppositional press en provincia. Newspapers such as La Verdad de Acapulco, El Diario de Xalapa, El Chapulín in Oaxaca, El Informador in Guadalajara, El Sol del Centro in Aguascalientes, and Tampico’s El Mundo and Apizaco’s Don Paco all managed, at times at least, to follow profoundly critical editorial lines. They constituted a fourth estate. They were joined by traveling corrido sellers, modern-day troubadours equipped with thin sheets of popular songs, which were read out and sung in markets, cantinas, and town squares. Many such Mexican samizdat explicitly criticized the state, from the Corrido del bra- cero, which decried the “brutal taxes/the fines and donations/the vile monopolies/of repulsive individuals,” to the Corrido de Jaramillo, which warned prospective peasant leaders that presidential hugs might be followed by a
“jaramillazo”: a bullet and a coffin. They were, the U.S. embassy concluded, “truly a mass medium.” Furthermore, even when bureaucrats could control the medium, they were unable to regiment reception. Vélez-Ibañez described the atmosphere at a cinema in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl as a cacophony of “boos, jokes, plays on words, whistling, commentaries, flatus, shuffling of feet . . . munching, belching, name calling, and cursing at friends, all combined with the sound track of the movie.” There was also “laughter (usually at the most inappropriate times).”

Such humor is interesting both as a constituent of and an optic onto state-society relations. Earthy ranchero jokes were a key recruiting tool for politicians from Alvaro Obregón through Ezequiel “Scarface” Cruz to Vicente Fox. Gonzalo N. Santos claimed to be a lifelong Obregonista because of a joke: when a general commiserated with Obregón on the loss of his arm, Obregón replied, “Thanks a lot, brother, but it would’ve been worse if they’d cut my cock off.” “This man,” enthused Santos, “really was one of us, because he really spoke like us! This one had to be our jefe.” At the same time, equally earthy jokes were a medium of subversion. They were not hard to find: on one bathroom wall rhyming couplets described the PRI as “a total son of a bitch . . . like this cubicle, smelling of shit.” Not all attacks were abstract: corridos nicknamed Alemán (“the biggest thief of all”) Ali Baba, while jokers mocked President Díaz Ordaz’s ugliness and the elderly Ruiz Cortines’s sexual weediness. During the successful 1952 movement to rid Oaxaca of an unpopular governor, guitar-wielding comics urged on female protestors, deriding rural heavies as impotent bumpkins. Even relajo—relatively mild and nonsensical communal wordplay and mockery designed to deflate serious situations—could focus discontent. When cultural missionaries arrived in the small town of Tezoatlán, Oaxaca, they publically catalogued the “many advantages” of their outfit, listing the “many ploughs,” “many crops,” and “many educated citizens” they had bestowed on other fortunate villages. In the midst of the speech, the local priest interjected “muchos maestros, mucha mierda,” deflating the missionaries’ serious tone and causing the meeting to disintegrate into “obscene jokes and name-calling.”

If humor occupied the intersection of politics and culture, what were its functions? The stock answer is resistance; jokes are widely accepted as one of the key weapons of the weak. Contemporary elites sometimes agreed. During the late 1940s a blend of devaluation, inflation, and baroque corruption proved a boon for aspirant satirists, who took street humor to the boards of Mexico City’s cabaret bars, mobile playhouses, and official theaters. Most performances passed without interference. But if the authorities suspected that critiques were sweepingly systemic or that dramatists had directly insulted the president, then repression was swift: performances were closed,
actors were jailed. Alemán ordered Usigli’s acid denunciation of contemporary politics, El gesticulador, to shorten its run.146 Government thugs shut down Roberto Blanco Moheno’s attack on state corruption, El cuarto poder, after only a few shows.147 Other heavies smashed the printing presses of Presente, the most critical magazine of the time.148 The somewhat simian Gustavo Díaz Ordax gave the most celebrated demonstration of state humorlessness, closing down El Diario de México for switching captions beneath his portrait and that of the monkeys at the local zoo.149

Other priístas, though, tolerated and even participated in the cynical, oft-obscene, and profoundly black humor of the age. Many seemed to bet that by embracing that subversive humor they might draw its satiric sting and even establish new if inconfesable solidarities with their constituents. Santos’s claim that his methods of “encierro, destierro y entierro” meant he needed grave-diggers not bureaucrats, or that “in this state, the only politician who is allowed to steal is me,” may have played well with his ranchero supporters while demonstrating more widely that he was “more bastard than dickhead.”150 Other in-jokes had their roots in the interiors of government offices rather than the fireside banter of the revolution, but they were no less rhetorically effective. Tuxpan politician César Garizurieta’s gag that “vivir fuera del presupuesto es vivir en error” or Mexico City mayor Carlos Hank González’s observation that “a poor politician is a poor politician” undoubtedly enraged some of the ruled; they may well have persuaded others that the politicians were “muy gente” or “one of us.”151 The reception of jokes like these (and their political impact) is self-evidently speculative. Yet their prevalence strongly suggests that they were not just matters of taste but also deliberate instruments to foster what Michael Herzfeld has called cultural intimacy, “the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of power that may at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation.”152

Finally, it is demonstrable that priístas, even when not cracking jokes themselves, appreciated the benefits of letting others do the same. Satire can vaccinate against more serious disorder; hence medieval elites’ tolerance of carnival excess, which actually “maintain[ed] local society in working order.”153 Censorship in Mexico alternated with periods of comic laissez-faire, when authorities allowed satirical newspapers like Presente, cabaret acts like Jesús Martínez “Palillo,” columnists like Carlos Monsivais and Renato Leduc, cartoonists like Abel Quezada or Rius, and writers like Jorge Ibarguengoitía to ridicule with only limited interference. At the same time, government
agents only rarely persecuted popular satire on the street. PRI leaders understood that much of the humor directed at the government served to express frustration in a nonthreatening manner: that the ability to pay a handful of centavos, sit before Ahí está el detalle, and watch Cantinflas mock the apretado elites could lend them legitimacy, while tolerating outbreaks of popular relajo merely acknowledged the lack of real revolutionary purpose behind the disorder. According to Palillo, President Alemán believed that “it was good that criticisms of a government occurred in a play and were designed to make people laugh, instead of building up hatred and provoking strikes, marches, and coups d’état as in South America.”

The deployment and management of humor is, in short, a microcosm of the blend of force and consent inside mid-century Mexico. Mexico was not Romania, where a famous joke went, “What did they give the winner of the national comedy awards? Fifteen years.” As Roland Barthes argued, though, “a little confessed evil saves one from acknowledging a lot of hidden evil.” Elites tolerated cutting café jokes at the same time as they killed peasant leaders, toppled local governments, winked at suspicious suicides, banned left-wing parties, and cut many Mexicans out of their economic model. That ambiguity, that interspersion of hard and soft power, of coercion and co-option and the shifting coalitions they built, are captured in a final joke of sorts: the dark, paradoxical pun of the dictablanda.

Authoritarianism with Adjectives

In Juan Linz’s classic definition, an authoritarian system is one “with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises powers, within formally ill-defined limits but quite predictable ones.” Mexico breaks these criteria in several key areas. It did lack elaborate ideology, being characterized above all by hard-nosed pragmatism, and it did have a distinctive mentality in the culture of revolutionary nationalism. In part because of that culture, however, its “limited pluralism” was often quite responsible, as elites juggled the competing interests of a broad range of social sectors. Party membership was impressive—by the early 1960s nearly 25 percent of the population belonged to the PRI—but it reflected neither extensive nor intensive political mobilization; as Carlos Madrazo pointed out, the crowds at mass rallies were “herds,” affiliated with the PRI without choice or conviction and “forced” to attend. There was some intensive mobilization in the frequent elections—across the twentieth century Mexico held well over eighty thousand elections—but it
was generally that of dissident factions or opposition parties in those local societies where representative politics persisted; power was distributed across society, well beyond the narrow bounds of a national leadership.

Neither did Mexico reproduce the mechanisms of power that characterize other nondemocratic states. As Knight observes, totalitarian states—the USSR, Nazi Germany, or Spain in the first decade of Franco’s power—are characterized by overt, systematic, and massive violence against the ruled; Mexico was not. Other authoritarian states relied heavily on extensive secret police forces, such as the estimated fifty thousand employees of Brazil’s Serviço Nacional de Informações; Mexico did not. The James Bond fallacy—that a spy agency might rely on a single agent to do everything—was actually realized in 1940s Mexico: at one point one man, Colonel Manuel Ríos Thivol, ended up dealing with a large proportion of the government’s crises. Most authoritarian states retain large armies: Pinochet’s Chile, for example, contained eleven soldiers for every thousand citizens. Mexico in the early 1950s had all of two soldiers per thousand. Finally, the unwritten rules meant that elite powers were indeed “formally ill-defined . . . but quite predictable.” Yet most authoritarian regimes are characterized by the stagnation of their elites, as strongmen and their coteries cling to power across decades. Mexico, in contrast, held to a constitutional mandate prohibiting re-election and smoothly circulated political elites every six years. Applying authoritarianism to mid-century Mexico clearly demands adjectives. Looking for them is not scholastic hair-splitting but rather a logical imperative: how can we discuss the sui generis nature of Mexican history without positing a genus in the first place?

Bureaucratic is not one of these adjectives. Like Argentina and Brazil, Mexico combined “high modernization” with decreasing real wages and attempts to control society through corporatist organizations. Unlike these countries, Mexico was not run by a narrow coalition of bureaucrats, large landowners, industrial bourgeoisie, and military. Landowners and soldiers were comparatively less significant in formal politics; the industrial proletariat was at least partially included, with a broad range of perks offsetting lower wages; and peasants, for all their declining wealth, had greater bargaining possibilities for coveted roads, schools, and rural health clinics. Furthermore, the “black fiscal economy” of tacitly sanctioned tax evasion and loan default allowed governments to extend this broad (if conditional) coalition on the cheap. As a result, even after historians unearthed significant levels of violence in Mexico, extreme coercion did not have the same “crucial importance” as in bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. While the Argentine junta killed an estimated thirty-two per one hundred thousand, Mexico’s official homicide rate at the same time was thirteen per one hundred
thousand. Authoritarianism is a well-populated genus, though, and two species do describe much of mid-century Mexico’s political reality: electoral authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism.

Electoral authoritarian regimes are those that “play the game of multi-party elections by holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy.” Competitive authoritarian regimes are a subset in which there is “real but unfair” competition in elections. Neither is a perfect fit. Elections were more than “instruments of authoritarian rule”; at the same time, there was no real competition for executive power in Mexico after 1952, as one mass party was banned and the other’s candidates failed to win more than 15 percent of the vote. Yet the other central aspects of the competitive authoritarianism model were all present. Elections were “arenas of contestation through which oppositions [could] legally—and legitimately—challenge incumbents,” who “[were] forced to sweat.” The opposition did participate with “both votes and thugs”; the cost of toleration was comparatively low, the cost of suppression quite high; the circulation of elites provided the means for recovery after losing. Civil liberties were “nominally guaranteed and at least partially respected.” While informal institutions—smoke-filled rooms—were often the main sites of decision-making, the PRI also “[packed] judicatures, electoral commissions, and other nominally independent arbiters and [manipulated] them via blackmail, bribery, and/or intimidation.” Finally, informal means of coercion were extremely important and ranged from the discretionary application of the law to the part-privatized, deniable violence that was salient but, like its critical military twin, subject to a “certain invisibility.”

Yet the PRI arrived at this outcome through wholly different processes than those driving contemporary competitive authoritarianism. This is usually the product of a balance of exogenous pressures toward democratization and endogenous abilities to resist both foreign and domestic opposition through “incumbent organizational power.” Neither applies to Mexico.

The United States fundamentally shaped Mexico’s economy—through export markets, direct foreign investment, and consumer culture—albeit to an extent that remains open to debate. In political terms, however, there was at best brief exogenous pressure on Mexico to democratize; for most of the period U.S. pressure on Latin American states was exerted in the opposite direction. In more general terms, a debate is implicit in the growing research on Mexico’s international conjuncture: did the Cold War change all that much? While several authors incorporate exogenous factors in their analy-
ses, this book does not dedicate a specific chapter to international relations; as such our argument is preliminary. We would, however, identify four main questions. Did the Cold War change the language of politics? Did it increase the degree of external—and particularly U.S.—influence? Did it radicalize Mexican society? Did it substantially redirect Mexican political development?

Following these lines, we posit that external linkages were not critical. It is obvious that contemporary actors adopted the dramatic language of the times. Alemán should have his term extended to ten years, opined one editorialist, as “the Cold War has to become a hot war.”177 “Germany and Japan,” a Henriquista general told his followers, “had wanted to go through Mexico to attack the United States, and Russia would surely try the same thing.”178 Normalistas listened to Radio Havana and held vigils for Che; even normalista socialites “were filled with socialist ideas.”179 Yet it is not at all obvious that exogenous discursive influence translated into strategic or political influence. In terms of security, Mexico received exceptionally low amounts of aid, arms, and training from the United States: out of the sixty-one thousand troops the United States trained in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, only 659 came from Mexico, despite U.S. aspirations to greater influence.180 (This is unsurprising, perhaps, given that Mexico’s war planners identified the United States as their main external threat.181) In terms of policy, Mexico frequently demonstrated its autonomy, whether refusing to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, renegotiating the terms of the foot-and-mouth campaign, winking at Castro’s training in Mexico, condemning the Bay of Pigs, or recognizing Castro’s government.182 Such foreign policy decisions were made for domestic rather than foreign purposes and consumption.183 As for communist influence, the PCM was, as Barry Carr points out, strikingly weak, numbering—by U.S. sources, which are unlikely to undercount—all of sixteen hundred members in 1950 (and that before a 1953 schism created the dissident Partido Obrero-Campesino Mexicano). The party’s Thirteenth Congress in 1960 brought together all of seventy-six delegates in a disused brothel.184 The Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), Mexico’s would-be continental labor anti-imperialists, received a grand total of thirty thousand dollars a year in Soviet subsidies.185 The Cold War did become more significant in the later 1960s, and the success of the Cuban Revolution did inspire guerrilla warfare on the left and mass demonstrations, tragicomic attempted coups, and low-level terrorism on the right. Yet guerrilla movements remained small: at their 1970s peak, intelligence counted 1,860 fighters scattered between 29 different groups.186 There were, moreover, no direct links between Cuba and Mexican guerrillas. By the standards of the 1910s or 1920s, mid-century governments were markedly more autonomous than their predecessors.
As for the radicalization of society, in Mexico the Cold War largely failed to inspire what Greg Grandin has termed the “politicization and internationalization” of everyday life. For the majority of Mexicans the Cold War may instead have depoliticized everyday life. At the political extremes left- and right-wing groups remained wedded to pre-existing rhetoric, alliances, and organizational structures. Rubén Jaramillo’s peasants were disenfranchised Cardenistas, the occasional burst of Marxist rhetoric as much a product of the CNC of the late 1930s as of international communism. Genaro Vázquez and Lucio Cabañas were revolutionary nationalists first, Cuban-style socialists very much second. Although the U.S. embassy and the Mexican government dressed up Celestino Gasca’s 1961 rebels as Che-reading revolutionaries, the blend of military officers, middle-class democrats, and angry peasants better resembled the 1940 Almazanista electoral alliance. The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) was a classic Cardenista organization, well-meaning, inclusive, and ramshackle, its rhetoric “written within the vocabulary of reformist movements.” Even anticommunist rebels, like the “últimos cristeros” who attacked Huajuapan’s garrison and Ciudad Hidalgo’s town hall in 1962, harked back to an earlier era and comprised radicalized members of the ACM. What polarization did exist proved if anything a political windfall for the PRI. By exaggerating the threat of armed revolt and repressing both left and right, the government pushed Mexicans toward the political center. Cárdenas withdrew his support from the MLN and took state employment as the head of the Río Balsas irrigation project. The new leader of the PAN, Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, pulled back from the party’s policy of paranoid McCarthyism, ordered activists to withdraw from conflictive local elections, and accepted the PRI’s offer of watered-down electoral reforms. Foreign policy, which balanced broad support for U.S. hemispheric defense with the right of Latin American countries to self-determination, exacerbated this shift, not only appeasing internal pressure groups but also solidifying the PRI’s reputation for maintaining the peace.

Gazing north to a United States embroiled in Korea and then Vietnam or south to a war-torn Guatemala, many Mexicans lauded their government’s pacific if inconsistent policies, feeling, perhaps, that Mexico remained “the best place to watch history from the ringside seats.”

The other major factor in stabilizing competitive authoritarianism is a reasonably powerful state. Assessed through Joel Migdal’s schema of state characteristics—the power to penetrate society, extract resources, regulate social relationships, and appropriate resources—PRIsta Mexico was little stronger than its Cardenista predecessor. The state had the technology and organization to extract resources and enjoyed some successes in penetrating society in material terms, including an expanding bureaucracy, social ser-
vices, rising school enrollment; in the cultural terms of disseminating revolu-
tionary nationalism, crafting an image of inevitability for the party, and
providing a common language for political debate; and in the political terms
of recruiting a mass party membership. Yet the quality of that penetration
was equivocal. Bureaucrats’ cognitive capacity remained low, to the extent
that basic geography sometimes escaped them; thus, in a fit of absent-
mindedness, Ometepec, Guerrero, was once relocated to Oaxaca, while
Zirándaro was moved to Michoacán. Basic data collection remained woe-
ful, particularly in the south: one economist complained that data collection
in Oaxaca rarely covered more than 40 percent of the territory, in Guerrero
perhaps 70 percent. Bureaucracies were bigger, but they often were canni-
balized by caciques or local interest groups and redirected away from state
projects toward regional or rent-seeking goals. At the serrano extremes, en-
tire regions used indigenismo to carve out parallel, contradictory autonomous
powers such as the Consejo Supremo Tarahumara. Mexico continued to
fail in the most basic regulation of social relationships, namely Weber’s
“monopoly of the legitimate use of violence”: everyday Mexicans pro-
tested against extrajudicial and/or privatized violence that encompassed pre-
electoral beatings, assassination, and petty massacre. As Piccato points out,
“impunity . . . was more tangible in everyday life than presidential power.”
Finally, critically, Mexico lacked the fundamental capability to appropriate
resources. Traditional resistance to taxation combined with easy evasion to
generate “incredibly low” revenues. In 1950 Mexicans paid the lowest taxes in
Latin America—a region, as Miguel Angel Centeno pointed out, where the
state was a “fiscal dwarf”—and little changed during the next fifty years.
Measured against the benchmarks of earlier scholarship, self-presentation,
or extraregional comparative cases, the Mexican state was rather weak.

Yet while the long-term fate of contemporary competitive authoritarian-
ism is murky, that of Mexico’s historical parallel was exceptional longevity.
Some of the answers to the paradoxes of authoritarianism and enduring ine-
quality are to be found in force: both physical violence and the resulting vio-
 lent imaginaries that multiplied its impact. Half-hidden force inhabited all
three arenas of power, from straightforward political repression to cultural
control to the key transfer of resources from countryside to city, which helped
buy off an urban population that could not be controlled militarily and that
never completely bought the state’s legitimacy. In the provinces caciques,
gunmen, and soldiers were central to the exercise of power and the mainte-
nance of authoritarian capitalism. Troops were sent to occupy ejidos, chase
local dissidents or insurgents, and break strikes, from the oilfields of Poza
Rica to the sugar mill at Zacatepec to the mines of Nueva Rosita to the hospit-
al corridors of Mexico City. They did more than just monitor elections:
they arrested leaders, beat protesters, toppled opposition ayuntamientos, and in extremis waded into marches and street fights to lethal effect. At key junctures the army was used in capital cities: troops were deployed against students in Oaxaca in 1952, Mexico City in 1956, Chilpancingo in 1960. Even high-ranking politicians could suffer overt military pressure. One officer made the attorney general publicly retract insinuations of extrajudicial executions; army patrols surrounded Henríquez Guzmán’s house before the 1952 transfer of powers. Well before Tlatelolco, state domination relied on violence significantly more than traditionally realized; brute force that was managed through careful targeting, concealment, and deniability. At critical junctures and in critical places—Mexico City in 1940, Baja California in 1962, municipios across the country when popular mobilization took hold—violence had causal primacy in sustaining PRIísta rule.

Yet while force was a sine qua non of PRIísta survival, consent weighed heavier in the balance as economic, cultural, and political accommodation attenuated the paradoxes of authoritarianism and inequality. In the economic arena, elites channeled the rewards of growth to key sectors, directly in the form of jobs in industry, salaries, and services and indirectly through regulating access to resources and, in particular, fast-growing national and international markets. Against a background of global postwar boom, demographic growth, infrastructural development, and the spread of consumer culture, acting as a gatekeeper to those markets helped build large coalitions on the cheap. Urban populations certainly did not buy state discourse wholesale, but faced with a series of economic dilemmas they did opt in large numbers for a grudging, conditional consent. Consent also was favored by the cultural legacy of revolution: a common language of power, a certain residual faith in a revolutionary state, and, on both sides of power, the memory of revolutionary apocalypse. Mexico is the only country in Latin America that might fit the European bellicist model of state formation, whereby “states make wars and wars make states”; but Mexico’s own Great War, the revolution, seems to have promoted a more pragmatic and resigned approach to the counter-currents of regional autonomy. At the intersection of culture and economics lay the practice of politics, in which institutional design and the high cost of repression favored co-option and the second chances that prevented elite exits. These rights were not granted free, although some PRIístas clearly were shrewd institutional designers; they also were gained by popular mobilization and by the veto power to which politicians and policies at all levels were subject. Consent was in part a product of the involuntary laissez-faire of a weak state, whose elites often were incapable of imposing their will; of the considerable cultural, local, and ethnic autonomies that weakness permitted; and of the dialectic of state formation that weakness imposed. And that
weakness, enforced flexibility, and inability to control local societies helped lend the state, for all the inequality of its economy, greater long-term stability than Latin America’s harder and heavier authoritarian monoliths.

“One of the easiest ways to define a concept,” Linz concluded, “is to say what it is not.” Mexico was not a perfect dictatorship: governments were too flexible yet institutional, popular inputs too great, and consent too negotiated to qualify as dictatorial, while politicians’ frantic juggling and frequent recourse to violence made Mexico nothing like Orwell or Huxley’s smooth-running dystopias. Neither was Mexico a classic, bureaucratic, or electoral authoritarian state. Among extant concepts, mid-century Mexico lay closest to competitive authoritarianism. Yet the processes underlying that outcome were utterly different. Mexican stability was not the product of a heavily political equation of external pressure versus sheer state power. External pressure for democratization was—with the brief exception of the mid-1940s—entirely absent. The aims, mechanisms, and results of Mexican state power were subject to multiple vetoes, which meant that quite often elites could not impose their will in the teeth of resistance and that the adroit exercise of soft power was critical. Single-factor theories—whether structural Marxism, cultural hegemony, or straightforward authoritarian repression—do not explain the ensuing balance of power as well as a historically contingent application of several middle-range theories. These span the circulation of elites, caciquismo, weapons of the weak, collective bargaining by riot, and local polyarchies; the interplay of hegemony, counter-hegemony, and cultural autonomy; and the cheap coalition-building characteristic of a gatekeeper state. This messy reality, with its contradictions, ambiguities, and considerable diversity, is captured when cultural, economic, and political analyses meet in a suitably contradictory term, dictablanda. Or, in comparative terms, soft authoritarianism: the combination of, on the one hand, a monopoly of national political office, carefully cultivated but thin cultural hegemony, lop-sided economic pay-offs, and resource regulation; and, on the other, hidden repressive violence with local autonomies, competitive if unequal elections, and salient popular bargaining and veto power. This produces unusually broad coalitions of political actors who shift fluently between opposition to, tolerance of, and support for a nondemocratic state. That shifting is central to the inherently ambiguous realities and legacies of a dictablanda, profoundly political ambiguities that in 2012 allowed the PRI out of the wilderness and back into Mexico’s corridors of power.

Notes


13. Kevin Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 290; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy, 14, 19, 81.


18. Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” World Bank Economic Review 10 (1996), 565–91. This is among the countries for which Deininger and Squire possess “high quality” data for the period.

19. Deininger and Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” 565–91. Incorporating the estimates and incomplete survey data (the only available for much of the world in this period), outside the Americas, only Rhodesia, Gabon, Kenya, Zambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria had higher Gini coefficients.


23. It was noted that he actually resembled Boris Karloff rather than Bela Lugosi. Peñalosa Varo to Alemán, May 18, 1944, AGN/DGG-2/311 G(9)2 exp. “elecciones para gobernador” vol. iv; Calvario to Catalán Calvo, January 2, 1945, AGN/DGG-2/311 M(9)
caja 4b.


33. Krauze, La Presidencia Imperial, 136.


36. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy, 9, 26, 52.


38. While Corrigan and Sayer stressed the importance of laws as moral regulators in Great Britain, this was seemingly lost in translation into a Mexican setting (Joseph and Nugent, “Popular Culture,” 20).


42. Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 7, 22, 42.


45. Jocelyn Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham, NC:


51. Armando Bartra, Guerrero bronco: Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2000); Alicia Olivera Sedano, Rina Ortiz Peralta, Elisa Servin, and Tania Hernández Vicencio, eds., Los matices de la rebeldía. Las oposiciones políticas y sociales (Mexico City: INAH, 2010); Rubin, Decentering the Regime; Sergio Aguayo Quezada, La Charola: Una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2001); Donald C. Hodges and Ross Gandy, Mexico under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism (London: Zed Books, 2002); María del Carmen Ventura Patiño, Disputas por el gobierno local en Tarecuato, Michoacán, 1942–1999 (Zamora: Co-


56. Clipping from El Mundo, in I-184 to Gobernación, May 11, 1944, AGN/DGIPS-100.

57. That is, for sale. El Fisgón y Helguera, El sexenio me da risa: la historieta no oficial (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1994), 22.


60. Instructions to S. Pavón Silva, April 1948, AGN/DGIPS-797/2-1/48/392.


64. For a sample of usefully contextualized reports, see “Spy Reports: Content, Methodology, and Historiography in Mexico’s Secret Police Archive” special issue of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 19, no. 1 (July 2013), ed. Tanalis Padilla and Louise E. Walker.


69. INEGI, *Estadísticas Históricas de México* CD-ROM.
71. Padilla, chapter 15, and Boyer, chapter 9, this volume.
72. Gillingham, chapter 16, this volume.
73. Hernández Rodríguez, chapter 14, this volume.
74. Paxman, chapter 13, this volume.
75. A conclusion not far removed from that of Carlos Monsiváis, who concurred with Paz in seeing 1968 as “un año axial” while recognizing its primary significance as perceptual: “... a la luz del 2 de octubre la historia de los años recientes cobra otra significación. Un acto represivo ilumina un panorama ...” [the history of recent years takes on another meaning in the light of October 2. A repressive act reveals a landscape ... ”]. Carlos Monsiváis, *Días de Guardar* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1970), 16–17.
85. Rath, chapter 3, this volume.
88. Rath, chapter 3, this volume.
92. Pellicer de Brody and Reyna, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 123–40.
94. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy, 269.
96. Snodgrass, chapter 7, this volume.
98. Pellicer de Brody and Reyna, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 9.
101. Gauss, Made in Mexico, 166, 185–90.
102. Paxman, chapter 13, this volume.
103. Mexico was not a gatekeeper state, however. It was not recently a colony, and it enjoyed more national autonomy, a more diversified economy, a larger institutional apparatus, and a more effectively powerful national identity than do such states. For the concept, see Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5, 156–90; Javier Corrales, “The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989–2002,” Latin American Research Review 39, no. 2 (2004): 35–65.


115. Blancarte, chapter 2, this volume; Fowler-Salamini, *Working Women*, chapter 6; Armella, *La formación social y política de los católicos mexicanos*.


121. Buck, “The Meaning,” 88–89; Sanders, Gender and Welfare in Mexico, 73–89.


125. Rafael Segovia, La politización del niño mexicano (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1975), 15–16.


130. Martínez, El despegue constructivo, 59.


132. An exception was El Día, founded in 1962.


134. Rubenstein, Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation, 95–97, 110–28.


136. Raine to State, February 24, 1950, NARG -712.00/2–2450.

137. Vélez-Ibáñez, Rituals of Marginality, 76.


139. Gonzalo N. Santos, Memorias (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1986), 167.


154. Portilla, Fenomenología.


158. Paradox is revealingly ubiquitous in this volume, variously deployed to describe taxation, indigenismo, elections, media policy, and regional strongmen.


161. Inaugural speech, quoted in Hernández Rodríguez, La formación del político mexicano, 126–27.


164. For Rios Thivol's packed 1947 schedule, see AGN/DGIPS-84/Manuel Rios Thivol/111.


166. Dirección General de Estadística, Séptimo censo general de población 6 de junio de 1950 résumen general (Mexico City, 1953); reports on the Mexican Army, 1951, 1953, FO-371/97547 and FO-371/109037.

167. Snodgrass, chapter 7, this volume.

168. Smith, chapter 11, and Paxman, chapter 13, this volume.


Mottier, “What Agricultural Credit and Debt Can Tell Us About the State in Mid-
Century Mexico,” paper presented at the 126th American Historical Association An-
nual Meeting, Chicago, January 5–8, 2012.

176. In their case studies of armed resistance and state repression, Tanalís Padilla, 
Alejandro Aviña, and Aaron Navarro posit that the Cold War was deeply influential; 
O’Neill Blacker, Renata Keller, and José Luis Piñeyro are more skeptical, whereas Ro-
berto Blancarte stresses the sui generis manifestation of anticommunism in Mexico. 
See Padilla, chapter 15, this volume; Navarro, Political Intelligence; O’Neill Blacker, 
“Cold War in the Countryside,” 181–210; Renata Keller, “A Foreign Policy for Domes-
la guerrilla rural en México: pasado y presente,” in Movimientos armados en México, ed. 
Oikión Solano and García Ugarte, vol. 1, 69–90, 71–74; Blancarte, chapter 2, this vol-
ume. In synthetic terms, Gil Joseph concludes that the United States’ Cold War aims 
and capacities were “mediated through, and substantially muted” by the PRI; Frie-
drich Katz likewise argues for Mexican exceptionalism; and Pablo Piccato warns 
against the risk of totalizing explanations that risk subordinating “local and national 
processes to the polarity of global powers.” Gilbert M. Joseph, “What We Now Know 
and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Stud-
ies,” in In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph 
and Daniela Spenser, 3–46, 26 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Friedrich 
Central y el Caribe, ed. Daniela Spenser, 11–31 (Mexico City: CIESAS, 2004); Pablo Piccato, 
“Comments: How to Build a Perspective on the Recent Past,” Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Research 19, no. 1 (July 2013): 92.


178. Inspectors RMA and VRA to Gobernación, October 13, 1952, AGN/DGIPS104/2–1/131/1071.

179. Padilla, chapter 15, this volume.

180. The United States was admittedly significant in the formation of the Dirección 
Federal de Seguridad. Piñeyro, “Las fuerzas armadas y la guerrilla rural”; Navarro, Po-
litical Intelligence, 179–86.

181. Mónica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in 

182. Lorenzo Meyer, “La Guerra fría en el mundo periférico: el caso del régimen 
autoritario mexicano. La utilidad del anticomunismo discreto,” in Spenser, Espejos de 
la Guerra fría, 95–117.


184. NARG-812.00B/439, “Political Conditions in Mexico from March 16, 1950, 
through April 15, 1950,” NARG-712.00/4–2150; Carr, Marxism and Communism, 176–95, 
220.

185. Compare this to the “nearly four million dollars” that the U.S. spent on covert 
action in Chile to prevent the victory of a Socialist or Communist in the 1964 presi-
dential election. Patrick Iber, “Managing Mexico’s Cold War: Vicente Lombardo Tole-
dano and the Uses of Political Intelligence,” in Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Research 19, no. 1 (July 2013), 15; Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental


188. Padilla, Rural Resistance, 91–98.


196. As Abel Quezada had observed thirty years earlier. Quezada, El mejor de los mundos imposibles, 321.


198. Follow up to Regino to Alemán, August 10, 1949, AGN/MAV-542.1/975; Liga to Alemán, November 17, 1947, AGN/MAV-551.2/7.


200. De la Peña, chapter 12, this volume.


202. Piccato, chapter 14, this volume.


206. Piccato, chapter 14, this volume; Inspectors VRA, RGM, and RMA to Gobernación, November 30, 1952, AGN/DGIPS-104/2–1/131/1071.
210. Mexico stands out in Latin America for experiencing two major international wars since Independence (three if we accept Aguilar Camín's description of the revolution as a war “between two distinct nations with parallel resources,” i.e., Sonora and the center). Hector Aguilar Camín, La Frontera Nomada: Sonora y la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: Siglo xx1, 1977).
211. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, 50.