Forced Marches

Soldiers and Military Caciques in Modern Mexico

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Military Caciquismo in the PRIísta State

General Mange’s Command in Veracruz

Paul Gillingham

The history of the Mexican military’s discrete self-effacement after the revolution is well known but under-researched. It is in many ways a peculiar story. The young, predatory generals of the revolutionary army, that strange hybrid of diverse citizens in arms, ended the bloody decade of the 1910s by taking a substantial majority of the federal budget and anointing themselves with national and regional powers. Three rebellions in the 1920s, however, allowed the Sonoran presidents to make culls on a grand scale. Álvaro Obregón, facing down the rebellion of a majority of his troops, halved the army at a stroke. Plutarco Elías Calles pushed through critical reforms, ley fuga’d his main military rivals, and easily suppressed the Escobar rebellion. Both military budgets and political representation declined steeply across the 1930s, and the army stayed loyal during the last big rebellion, that of Saturnino Cedillo, in 1938. In the early 1940s, the army’s (substantially overrepresented) corporate sector of the revolutionary party was suppressed. In 1945, soldiers were banned from participating in “political affairs or tasks, whether directly or indirectly”; that same year, 550 revolutionary generals were allegedly forced into retirement. In 1946, the last military president stepped down. Among the great advances of the 1940s, Excélsior editorialized, was the army’s realization of “its noble guidelines as a fundamental institution of the patria through stopping soldiers . . . from sticking their oar into politics.” Scholars by and large have agreed, reinforcing the Mexican military’s self-image of early institutional unity, professionalization, and depoliticization and depicting the army post-1940, as does Edwin Lieuwen, as “a pliable and disciplined tool of the civilian
leaders of the Mexican nation.” Budgets back this master-narrative of cost-free demilitarization. By the 1970s, Mexico spent less of the national wealth on her armed forces than any other country in Latin America, including Costa Rica.

In such a story a general like Alejandro Mange Toyos comes as something of a surprise. Mange was a staunch Callista, close enough to the jefe máximo (national boss) to rally round him (together with Joaquín Amaro and a few others) when he returned from exile in Los Angeles in December 1935. The other generals were demoted, and Amaro, the architect of the postrevolutionary military, went on to resign his commission. Mange, on the other hand, was soon thereafter given command of the Twenty-sixth Military Zone in Veracruz. This was a prize job: the Twenty-sixth was the most powerful provincial zone command, grouping three regular infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, three battalions of irregular reserves, and even one of the (very scarce) artillery units. The posting, moreover, presupposed trustworthiness: Veracruz was a good place to run a rebel government, and the Interoceanic Railway of Mexico gave its troops ready access to the capital. Veracruz was furthermore one of the wealthiest states, affording its military commanders rich business opportunities. Finally, Mange’s command endured when Miguel Alemán Valdés rose to national power as secretario de gobernación (secretary of the interior), a distinct surprise given that it was Mange’s troops who had executed Alemán senior in 1929. Despite this baggage, Mange was not disposed to conciliate the clever and unscrupulous young lawyer. When Alemán launched his bid for the presidency, Mange joined a diverse group of generals who placed ideological differences second to the maintenance of military power in Mexico City, and he toured Veracruz promoting the alternative candidacy of General Miguel Henríquez Guzmán. “Un hijo de la chingada pelele,” Mange was heard to bluster, “can’t control the military, nor be president.” But the civilian Alemán did assume the presidency and quickly purged assorted provincial power brokers, including the governors of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Tamaulipas. Yet he left Mange well alone. General Mange went on, in fact, to command Veracruz until his reluctant retirement in 1959. His was a long-lived military cacicazgo (fief), which left him extensive and diverse business interests across the state and which does not conform to mainstream scholarly appreciations of military-state relations in Mexico.

Caciquismo is a central organizing concept in understanding Mexican political history. It describes an informal, backstage system of clientelist domination, often disowned but rarely (if ever) discarded by national elites.
The main features of its operators, the caciques, are that they are (i) local or regional political leaders, (ii) exercising autocratic, personalist rule, which is rooted in (iii) violent capabilities, and (iv) their status as middlemen between local societies and the state. They are usually (v) hegemonic, in the sense of offering at least some choice between pan o palo (carrot or stick); (vi) extremely mutable, all-pervasive colonizers of institutions without much distinction; and (vii) while portrayed as antithetical to state, frequently irreplaceable components of much state functioning. While the precise borders between the two types are fuzzy, caciques are not caudillos—in Mexican usage, it should be stressed. The differences lie in the scale of their dominion and the scale of their violence; i.e., they are neither cupular nor praetorian enough to cast the long shadow of a caudillo.16 General Mange’s power as zone and later region commander in Veracruz fulfils all of the above criteria of caciquismo. His cacicazgo’s longevity—across several presidential terms, in the face of both presidential and popular enmity, and in defiance of longstanding policy requiring rotation in command—left onlookers baffled.17 It was an impressive exercise of autonomy, or, in Weber’s definition—an actor’s capacity “to carry out his will despite resistance”—power.18

This chapter explores the concept and consequences of military caciquismo through Alejandro Mange’s career, paying particular attention to his lengthy reign in Veracruz. That reign—from 1937 to 1959—coincided, of course, with the formative years of the PRIísta state. It is not intended as a history of great men on a provincial, cacical scale, but rather as a case study in demilitarization and its defects in Mexico: a modest form of what Ian Kershaw calls structuralists’ biography, “looking instinctively . . . to downplay rather than to exaggerate the part played by the individual, however powerful, in complex historical processes.” (Nor do I intend to hint that General Mange, for all his rough edges, was a little Hitler; although he was, like Hitler, an “indispensable fulcrum” charged with personalist, clientelist, and violent power inside the part-bureaucratic, part-Hobbesian world of mid-century Veracruz.)19 Such case studies (with epistemological safety in numbers) will be essential as Mexico’s incremental archival opening permits historians to revisit, extend, and perhaps modify the generalizations of earlier scholars. For while historians of Brazil have used a similar incremental opening of the military archives to profitably reconsider the military’s role in Brazilian politics and state formation, contemporary Mexicanists have so far produced meager analysis of the army’s part in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary regimes.20 In such a context, the advice proffered by political generals from Napoleon to Patton—“De l’audace,
encore de l’audace, toujours de l’audace”\textsuperscript{21}—may be of some use to historians. In its spirit, this chapter advances a hypothesis based on a single—albeit extended—case study.

This hypothesis is that Mexican demilitarization was more complex Faustian pact than zero-sum game of power. While a marked military withdrawal from the highest levels of national politics did indeed occur, it happened both later and against significantly more opposition than hitherto believed. It was, consequently, significantly less complete than hitherto believed, and it came at the cost of a certain continuity in the independence, rent-seeking, and petty politicking of generals and other military actors across the Mexican countryside. This may have been masked by the military’s subtle but enduring cultural control: a long-lasting control revealed in their successful censorship of \textit{Rojo Amanecer}, a 1989 film on the Tlatelolco massacre, or in the eight years General José Francisco Galardo Rodríguez spent in jail for proposing increased transparency in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{22} Analysts remain hamstrung by a very partial release of army records. At the moment, the military documents for most of the twentieth century are confined to army yearbooks and personnel files.\textsuperscript{23} Yet some striking indicators of enduring military autonomy are to be found in those personnel files. The service records of officers like Mange chart in some detail an exchange of national influence for institutional independence and provincial cacicazgos—an exchange that implied, moreover, clear continuities with an earlier age of military politics. Not all those continuities were costs to the state. The army continued to play a critical state-building role, ensuring rural control and “softening up” local societies for bureaucratic domination. Yet the hidden costs, the soldiers’ “residual political roles,” could—as David Ronfeldt has argued—add up to a quasi-independent, parallel government structure or “a world,” as a recent US Embassy assessment had it, “largely separate from the rest of Mexico.”\textsuperscript{24}

Alejandro Mange was well placed to advance himself in that parallel state by birth, if nothing else. He was born in Hermosillo, Sonora, in 1885, and so although he went to the revolution a corporal, he was a corporal who knew the Sonoran revolutionary leaders from the outset: Calles made him an officer, Obregón made him a major, and by 1920, when he was one of a handful present to sign the Plan of Agua Prieta, he had made general. There was more to his rapid promotion than northern cronyism, though, and the breadth of experience he garnered in his first two decades as a general make it clear that Mange was a useful fighting soldier.\textsuperscript{25} His main military experience lay in counter-insurgency: the main task, given the level of strategic threat posed by Belize and Guatemala, of the modern Mexican
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army.\textsuperscript{26} He fought Yaquis in the 1910s, delahuertistas and Cristeros in the 1920s, and—at a lower, less visible, less admissible level—peasant and worker activists across the entire period. His exemplary service during the 1929 Escobar rebellion made him, Lienwen suggests, one of the key political generals of the time.\textsuperscript{27} He served clear across Mexico, from Aguascalientes to Zacatecas or, in less rhetorical and more geographical terms, from Yucatán to Sinaloa. At one time or another, he commanded most of the major states, whether in terms of wealth, such as Puebla or Veracruz, or in terms of instability, such as Morelos, Michoacán, or Chihuahua.\textsuperscript{28} He must also have been an able administrator; as head of the department of infantry of the Secretariat of National Defense under Amaro, he believed himself on brink of becoming secretary himself in 1943.\textsuperscript{29} Denied that, he did however end his career with one of the top regional postings, overseeing the Gulf Command.\textsuperscript{30}

Certain key themes emerged in Mange’s widely varied commands between 1916 and 1937, the year he took over Veracruz. He was from the outset a deeply political soldier. His first zone command, the Nineteenth Zone in Yucatán, was the product of an ouster he engineered: dispatched on an inspection tour, he cultivated local allies, including the leaders of the Partido Socialista del Sureste (Socialist Party of the southeast), with whose backing he replaced the incumbent zone commander General Carmona. (He also engineered Carmona’s arrest, apparently embittered by Carmona’s successful rivalry for the affections of a prostitute: lucky in Mexican army machinations, unlucky in love?)\textsuperscript{31} He went on to play a significant role in Felipe Carrillo Puerto’s toppling of his incumbent Liberal Party rivals.\textsuperscript{32} Moving on to command in Nayarit, Mange was accused of attempting another ouster—this time of the agrarian reformers in the agrarista state government—by dint of a campaign of political assassination whose targets stretched from ejidatarios to state senator Pedro López.\textsuperscript{33}

Here a second theme emerges, namely Mange’s political conservatism. In his Campeche, Durango, Nayarit, and Veracruz commands, he allied himself consistently with rural and urban bourgeoisies against agrarian reformers and union militants.\textsuperscript{34} There were cultural reasons for his choice of sides: Sonorans had little tradition of communal ownership or litigation, and their largely arid state favored capital-intensive, extensive agribusiness. Sonora, as a result, had very few agraristas, and her entrepreneurial, export-minded elites had very little sympathy with them.\textsuperscript{35} (“We have no agraristas here, thank God,” Obregón is supposed to have said.)\textsuperscript{36} There were also sound economic reasons for generals to make conservative alliances across this period, commercial farmers and pistoleros generally...
making better business partners than first-generation ejidatarios. And therein lies the third main theme of Mange’s career, namely his success in exploiting the rent-seeking, empire-building possibilities that provincial command could afford. His early business dealings, cropping up in scattered denunciations from peasant telegrams and provincial newspapers, were relatively modest. In Yucatán, Mange was supposedly corrupted by free petrol, expensive suits, and five hundred pesos a month; in Nayarit, the dominant Aguirre family was reported to have recruited the general against importuning agraristas, gaining control of post and telegraph and a “reign of terror” through the gift of a car. Mange apparently missed out, however, on the bonanza that the Cristiada represented to some of his contemporaries, such as Maximino Ávila Camacho, and it took his command in Veracruz to draw out his full entrepreneurial potential.

Veracruz in the late 1930s was a failing state. Peasants and workers in the 1920s had achieved unusual power, the former thanks to their organization, leadership, and the arms they had obtained in defense of the regime, and the latter—particularly in the cases of oilworkers and railwaymen—through their grasp on strategic resources. Both groups had allied themselves with Adalberto Tejeda’s state government, promoting some regional stability in the face of land reform and conservative resistance and rebellion. When Tejeda was toppled in 1933, the federal government’s priority was to avoid any single actor’s dominance of the state. But by March 1937, however, Cándido Aguilar had taken control of many of the state’s agrarian leagues and unions and had installed a client, Miguel Alemán Valdés, as governor. Seeking a counterweight to such concentrated power, in April President Cárdenas sent Alejandro Mange to command the Twenty-sixth Military Zone in Veracruz, where he immediately began disarming Aguilarista defensas rurales. So far—from a central perspective at least—so good. But in containing Aguilar’s regional capabilities, Cárdenas fostered two fresh, enduringly powerful, and conservative cacicazgos, those of General Mange himself and of Miguel Alemán. While the two men were enemies, Mange’s dominance of the Twenty-sixth Zone (and much more in Veracruz) survived until his 1959 retirement. His longevity was eloquent testimony to the difficulty of controlling the state and to the center’s reliance on the military toward that end. Mange was the main beneficiary of that reliance, controlling the state’s flawed but (for a long time) only effective violent agency in a Machiavellian environment of highly aggressive geographical and organizational fiefdoms. In exerting some form of tenuous control there—for both his masters’ and his own benefit—he oversaw four main types of state violence: the informal tasks of collective repression,
decapitation, and decimation of popular movements, and the more formally acknowledged duty of maintaining everyday social control.

Collective repression was the army’s main job. Mange’s soldiers broke strikes, disrupted union dissidents’ activities, raided ejidos, and toppled agrarista or opposition town councils in localized coups. Threats alone sometimes sufficed. General Mange attempted to end a strike in Boca del Rio by touring the pickets, “recommending” that the strikers disperse (which misfired when one striker failed to recognize his car and shot him.) He was usually more successful. By the mid-1940s, the military regularly intervened in the frequent stoppages that hampered port operations in Veracruz; in 1948, Mange stopped cross-class demonstrations in Orizaba against the cost of living by warning organizers that he would forcibly dissolve any march. The regularity with which the army actually used violence gave weight to such threats. Soldiers beat dissidents and raided houses in repressing the oilworkers’ union in a struggle for control with grassroots militant leaders which ended in the 1949 takeover of the Poza Rica oilfields and the Minatitlán refinery. Such political dissidents, particularly in rural frontier zones, could face actions ranging from mass arrests to undeclared counter-insurgencies: in March 1945, for example, soldiers killed five peasants who had armed themselves against the sugar mill’s pistoleros in their fields near Zempoala in central Veracruz. While such killings drew intense protests, they did not ever lead to a reprimand. Collective repression was a delicate task on the borderline of the state’s accepted practice. If it misfired or was disowned by elites, it could damage a career: thus some of the familia revolucionaria ruled out General Bonifacio Salinas Leal as presidential material due to his responsibility for the León massacre.

Yet elites saw much collective repression as justified by raison d’état, and successful practitioners such as Mange tended to be rewarded rather than rebuked.

Decapitation, the assassination of dissident leaders, was less costly, more deniable, and less provocative than collective repression, and it was widely employed across the period. It was also a task which did not necessitate direct army involvement, although there were cases of regular soldiers carrying out killings. In 1947, for example, Lieutenant Abel, a corporal, and three hitmen accompanied the manager of “La Gloria” sugar mill to the Cempoala baseball ground to invite a shop steward for a beer; the lieutenant shot the union leader as he drank it. Reports of killings by soldiers dressed as peasants or peasants dressed as soldiers—a reporting formula which insinuated without risking actual accusation—were frequent enough in Veracruz. The numerous, historically unknown ejidatarios (and the less numerous workers) whose deaths populate interior ministry
files were probably in many cases the non-commissioned officers of disidence. In others, they may merely have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Mange’s troops were accused of maintaining black lists of ejidatarios who were to be shot, or of thinning out the ranks of ejidatarios on a commission basis for local economic elites. Mange was also influential in decapitation and decimation through sins of omission, turning a blind eye (wherever possible) to the violence of his conservative allies and affines. Many of the motives for decimation were economic: to prevent ejidatarios from taking up grants, to move them off already existing plots, to control their land use, or to discourage them from applying for extensions. However, the impact of such violence was profoundly political. In extreme cases, decimation caused whole groups to go into exile: cattlemen killed the agraristas of the Veracruz hinterlands who refused them grazing, causing many to leave the area. More commonly, the attrition of regular violence softened up local societies for domination, obliging recalcitrant peasants to accept what offers of increased security they could, whether proffered by pistoleros or by the nearest arm of the state.

Recovering the central meaning of military violence is often difficult. Victims tended to present all provincial violence as factional and hence illegitimate. Dissident politicians encouraged them to do so for tactical advantage. Victims and perpetrators were consequently locked in a perpetual struggle to control the accepted meaning of violent acts. The country people arrested, beaten, and sometimes shot or hanged in army, reserves, or police operations were deemed ejidatarios or campesinos by their political allies, and bandits or cattle rustlers by the violent agency in question. For a historian to distinguish between factional and more neutral, order-seeking violence is sometimes guesswork, and inevitably constitutes a political decision in itself. Neither were factional violence and more neutral, order-seeking violence mutually exclusive categories. There was, rather, frequent overlap between the two. Yet while such distinctions are intrinsically dubious, it is clear that at least some acts of provincial violence aimed more at the maintenance of basic stability than at the explicit promotion of factional interest constituted—by a very crude, normative definition at least—legitimate policing operations.

Formally, these should never have happened. Article 129 of the Constitution of 1917 specified that “in time of peace, no military authority may perform any functions other than those that are directly connected with military affairs”; it was a dead letter. State elites depended overwhelmingly on the army for policing from the armed revolution until the late 1940s. (Mónica Serrano suggests that the army’s policing role was particularly...
marked in the 1950s; the trends of the late 1940s and early 1950s in Veracruz and Guerrero suggest instead a partial, regionally varied but noteworthy decline in that role.50 It was customary for governors to include a catch-all acknowledgement of the military’s role in “maintaining public order” in their annual reports, which greatly underrepresented the omnipresence of soldiers in carrying out a broad range of police tasks.51 In towns and cities, the army controlled crowds, unions, the press, gamblers, prostitutes, and even politicians.52 On the eve of Orizaba’s 1949 municipal elections, Mange’s chief of staff, General Joaquín Martínez Iñiguez, called the bitterly opposed candidates together and “instructed them in an appropriate and educated way to go into the political contest with the utmost order and that both precandidates should refrain from bringing in outside contingents and should make the said primary elections a civic function that burnished the reputation of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, the Institutional Revolutionary Party) as well as the Civil and Military Authorities.”53 Election days across the 1940s were usually policed by the army, as the civilian police were seen as inevitably politicized.54 Yet the army’s principal role remained rural policing, and a substantial proportion of their business was to manage collective violence in the countryside.

Central to this was despistolización (gun control). Under the terms of the 1943 law on firearms, soldiers, reservists, policemen, teachers, and bureaucrats could all carry guns; all other actors needed permits from the Secretariat of National Defense or became liable to on-the-spot confiscation and arrest.55 The decision to increase the regulation of arms was an extremely significant decision in a country where, in Frank Tannenbaum’s words, “political life was lived with a gun at hand.”56 Gun control was difficult to enforce, and the army’s efforts tended to be at best local, equivocal, and reversible. In Veracruz, Mange’s efforts in the middle of the 1945 crime wave reportedly disarmed all of eleven people, and in 1952, an estimated 95 percent of guns remained unlicensed.57 The army did more than decide whom to disarm: the zone commander simultaneously, through his powers of appointment to the reserves, decided whom to arm. As the hard men of different local factions struggled physically in the streets, cornfields, and plantations, they simultaneously struggled with words to convince the zone commander and the federal government of their claims to defend law and order and the common good. The make-up of the reserves was fluid, and they sometimes changed dramatically when the zone commander changed. In Veracruz, Mange disarmed many of the groups constituted by his predecessor, General Heriberto Jara, and by the regional cacique General Cándido Aguilar, handing the guns over to their
opponents. Such radical shifts in local balances (or imbalances) of power generated intense correspondence between local power brokers and the center, as the beneficiaries of the new order defended it as meritocratic and the losers complained of political bias, criminal pasts, corruption, and clientelism. Vital competition for arms and recognition demonstrated how, beneath a surface of multiple competing violent agencies, the federal army enjoyed considerable potential to rig the market of violence.

Three phenomena in particular militated against the army’s depoliticization in the states. Provincial commands were frequently overstretched in trying to cover extensive, ill-communicated, and unstable territories, an overstretch revealed in large operations such as the foot-and-mouth campaign, which left troops in the rainy season in Veracruz without tents or rations. This overstretch left commanders with profoundly imperfect information regarding their zones of influence, allowing crooked or incompetent subordinates to flourish and political targets to be sold to them as straightforward criminals. It also pushed them inevitably into ad hoc local alliances that, in turn, drew them further inside the faction-ridden politics of local societies. There were, moreover, debilitating contradictions at the highest level of the state, exemplified in the regular flouting of the policy on rotating commanders. Commanding officers continued to be posted to their home states, where they arrived with ready-made cacical networks: Adrián Castrejón was an ex-governor when he took over Guerrero in 1945, while General Othón León Lobato, who took over the Twenty-sixth Military Zone in 1952, was a xalapeno who had previously run for governor. When commanders “went native,” the results were generally grim for local societies; as a letter from several high-ranking officers to Alemán explained, “The jefes of the Military Zones should, in our view, be transferred [regularly], as when they settle in they make themselves Dictators, they monopolize the state’s Business . . . as a concrete case you have General [Pablo] Diaz Avila, in Cuernavaca, Mor., jefe of the 24th Zone, who has great landholdings, some of which he has bought, and others of which he has taken by force.” Finally, the numerous opportunities for self-enrichment that provincial military command afforded were taken up with some regularity. The army was an institution without the power to achieve lasting neutrality, but with more than enough power to reward extensive rent-seeking behavior in its cadres.

Army officers such as Mange turned their commands into highly successful businesses in four ways: licensing other, more junior violent entrepreneurs; renting out their troops’ violent capabilities; grafting from the army budget; and using their cacical power to foster their own, private enterprises. Sometimes they licensed provincial violence in quite literal terms,
selling reserve commissions and gun permits; at other times, they merely raked off surpluses in systematic bribes from pistoleros. (These practices later transferred across to the drug trade, with northern commanders selling smugglers garantías (constitutional protections) of an unconventional nature.) In 1945, the bandit Bartolo Lara gave General Mange three thousand pesos and a horse in exchange for a commission as a commander of reserves in the Soledad de Doblando area. This may have been—as in the unreformed British Army of the early nineteenth century—something of a going national rate for such appointments: in Tecpan, Guerrero, General Pedro Pizá Martínez demanded about the same price for the same service. (Pizá Martínez, a busy man, also demanded money for gun licenses and for permits to celebrate saints’ days.) Officers also rented their violent capabilities in diverse ways that ranged from taxing public space through protection to extortion. A detachment on the Poza Rica road was paid off by the local ferry owner to block the bridge, forcing drivers to pay four pesos a crossing. In Chihuitán, Oaxaca, Mange himself was reported to have executed thirty-three villagers as rebels in 1929, releasing those whose families paid five hundred pesos or more. Not all profiteering was violent. Straightforward graft was also good business, as the army’s institutional autonomy allowed generals to put down whistleblowers with trumped-up charges. Charges of systematic graft reached the very top of the army: in 1948, spies reported that the secretary himself, General Gilberto Limon, had sold personal landholdings in Mexico City to the army at a 1,000 percent markup. Officers could, finally, use political alliances, free army labor, and violence to build extensive and highly competitive businesses. In Alto Lucero, Veracruz, Lieutenant Colonel Sebastián Contreras ordered his local operatives to steal cattle. In Chiapas, General Antonio Rios Zertuche used soldiers as agricultural workers on his estates and charged the local government four thousand pesos a month for “public works”; in Mexico City he obtained a large share of the Lomas de Chapultepec at the knockdown price of sixty centavos a square meter when they were subdivided; in Veracruz he obtained the lucrative contract to clear the site of the Palma Sola military colony, keeping the timber cut as a bonus. In Veracruz the charges against General Mange reached epic proportions, with his “multitude of properties” stretching into Oaxaca, connected by roads built by soldiers and funded by “taxes” on trade, gambling, and gunmen.

The military’s contemporary reputation for professionalism and neutrality was consequently a fragile plant. A colonel inspected the Chicontepec garrison in 1946, registered the townmen’s preference for military over
corrupt civilian policing, and concluded that “the federal troops who cover the region enjoy the trust and esteem of the inhabitants for their clean and honorable record.”72 Two years later the same garrison was denounced to the presidency for assaults, extortion, cattle rustling, and threatening to burn hamlets that complained.73 Such violence—driven by economic incentives, political competition, or more frequently, a Gordian combination of both rationales—did not support so much as subvert the state. In the 1940s, the sum of the army’s multiple roles in provincial life added up to a lot more than a military that had, in Lieuwenn’s misleading conclusion, “had it politically.”74 The military remained deeply inserted in the everyday life of local societies across Mexico: in the early 1950s, there were small, generally platoon-sized garrisons in some 650 of Mexico’s municipalities, approximately 20 percent of the total.75 Research suggests that these garrisons were often closely intertwined with local elites and other violent agencies.76 The resulting overlap between public and private agencies of violence hampered attempts to reduce provincial violence and slowed, in some cases blocked, the expansion of an effective, centralized state.

General Mange’s first decade in the Veracruz command exemplified the pitfalls of Mexico’s overreliance on the military for order in the countryside. Arriving in 1937, he quickly tapped into the system of territorial domination run by the leading regional gunmen agrocapitalists, establishing an effective dyarchy with Manuel Parra. Parra was a commercial farmer, who had made the Hacienda de Almolonga the center of economic and political domination of some twenty-five municipios. He was a violent entrepreneur, with close links to the defense ministry, accused of “thousands” of killings, and something of a hegemon (at least according to the Corrido de Manuel Parra, a possibly biased source).77 Heriberto Jara, the departing zone commander, had maintained something of a bloody balance of power in the countryside by arming agrarian radicals while tolerating their opponents’ violence.78 Mange, who had a history of energetic alliances with local bosses against agraristas, set out from the start to disarm peasant militias and to redirect the sequestered army rifles to Parra’s men. He failed to prevent arms shipments from the coast from reaching Parra’s Hacienda de Almolonga. He also visited Parra, with whom he had a “regular and frequent” correspondence, and was observed meeting other pistoleros, such as Gonzalo Lagunes.79 This shift in power gave Parra an unusual ascendancy, exercised through a paramilitary force of some five hundred men.80 Parra’s 1943 heart attack ushered in a less-stable era, when the former consensus on spheres of influence was undercut by rivalries such as that between the Armenta family of Plan de las Hayas and
Crispín Aguilar of Actopan. By 1945, a pistolero civil war was underway as different groups struggled to replace Parra as the acknowledged leader.81 Yet even as bands sent by the Armentas invaded Actopan, notably collegial practices still obtained the highest level of the pistolero/military alliance.82 In 1945, for example, Mange summoned the leaders of central Veracruz’s guardias blancas (paramilitaries) to a meeting in the port, where he complained that their feuding had given General José Reyes Esquivel in Martínez de la Torre “a very bad impression” of them. He asked them to visit the general’s headquarters and explain themselves; they rented a bus and traveled together to meet Reyes at a petrol station in Perote. From there they went on to Reyes’s barracks, where the pistoleros explained “that they were slandered in the sense that they were killers and bandits but that that was not true.” They were, they assured him, unified and prepared to give constitutional guarantees to the agraristas they had made refugees. The gunmen then returned to the state capital, where they tried to meet the commander of state police. Or so went the semi-official story; gobernación agents suspected it to be a smokescreen, behind which Mange and the pistoleros had really been coordinating support for the presidential campaign of General Henríquez Guzmán.83 Whichever version happened to be true, the matter-of-fact way in which Veracruz’s gunmen did business with the state’s military and police commanders revealed their normalized role inside the state’s ruling classes—entitled, whatever their foibles, to a substantial cuota de poder, a codified and clearly defined share of regional power.

This period, the early to mid-1940s, was the peak of Mange’s power. Faced with a weak presidency, a moribund agrarian movement, and a weak governor, his alliance with the pistoleros furnished the most reliable source of some degree of “stateness” for large areas of central and southern Veracruz. He was formally in command of not just the Twenty-sixth Military Zone, but the entire Gulf Coast. His control over local society extended to the venerable and influential bourgeois press, as he posted Captain Arias Barraza as a “representative” inside El Dictamen, giving him constant favorable press coverage, “defending his killings and cock-ups with enthusiasm.” (A son had married into the powerful owners’ family, the Malpicas.)84 Gobernación agent Gonzalo Migoni reported how “General Mange . . . possesses a multitude of properties and is a very rich landowner in the Zone he commands, and even beyond it: in Oaxaca, bordering Veracruz, where his subalterns impose taxes and charge their own ‘taxes’ on gambling, which is rife across the state, without anyone doing anything about it because the municipal authorities have fixed their “contributions”;}
the soldiers taking part too.”85 Vox populi called repeatedly for his removal and deemed him “the biggest thief in Veracruz”; gobernación agents detailed his property and business empires, his rents from gambling—“cards, roulette, dice”—and his protection and selling of reserve command appointments in recurrent critiques of military corruption.86 Yet while Agent Migoni railed, seemingly without effect, from the port of Veracruz about Mange as a “genuine disgrace,” “incapable of offering constitutional guarantees through the federal forces at his command which are distracted in other engagements and serve as tools for personal vendettas,” a series of national ruptures in civil/military relations were on the point of reducing military autonomy in Veracruz and across the rest of Mexico.87

The first of these ruptures was superficially apolitical, an administrative rather than partisan question of changing the division of labor in provincial policing to increase civilian responsibilities. Yet as any Weberian would note, the implications of that change were profoundly political. In Veracruz—as in many other regions of Mexico—Alemán’s sexenio coincided with the emergence of a newly technocratic breed of governor, who invested heavily in expanding civilian policing and court systems. Initially impotent, Governor Adolfo Ruiz Cortines had by the late 1940s something of his own violent autonomy vis-à-vis the army, and used it convincingly to crush Mange’s former pistolero allies. Armed with jeeps, generals, and Mausers, the state police of Veracruz ceased to rely completely on the army for force. This was the real beginning of what demilitarization did occur in the countryside. The professionalization of police, the suppression of pistoleros, and the attendant attempts to reduce the numbers and scale of everyday military operations were central to curbing rural violence after 1945. These PRIísta policies were a distinct contrast to those followed in contemporary Colombia during the bloody civil war of La Violencia, where a Conservative government politicized the police, encouraged the formation of Conservative hit squads, and militarized the countryside. Mexican policies were distinctly more successful. (In the light of this comparative history, the recent convergence between the two cases, centered in Mexico on rural remilitarization, is disturbing.)88 The generals, no longer indispensable, lost appreciable leverage over local societies and national politicians.

The second rupture was profoundly political, a confrontation between army and government that teetered on the brink of a coup d’état. While the tensions preceded Alemán’s election, the catalyst was the “very great” shock of the July 1948 devaluation.89 As the peso crashed in two weeks from 4.85 to 7.50 to the US dollar, two groups of influential conservative
generals coalesced and began circling what appeared to many a fatally wounded administration.90 (There was also, US diplomats reported, a revolutionary movement in gestation that counted on junior officers.)91 One group, meeting at Antonio Ríos Zertuche’s house, centered around powerful, mainly northern commanders such as Rodrigo Quevedo, Bonifacio Salinas Leal, Anacleto López, Miguel Z. Martínez, and Román Yocupicio and considered recruiting Abelardo Rodríguez as an emergency replacement for Alemán.92 The second was led by the director of Colegio Militar (national military college), General Luis Alamillo Flores, in many ways the army’s leading thinker, and had his patron General Joaquín Amaro as a figurehead.93 Exactly how their would-be coups were defused remains—despite the open intelligence files—unclear. Intelligence and diplomatic reports do make it clear that for six weeks Alemán’s survival hung in the balance. The intelligence agencies flooded Mexico City with agents whose reports, from unions, cafés, markets, and the street, sniffed revolution in the air. As early as July 24, there were rumors of a popular rising; flyers, corridos, and gossip all predicted the same, and the assassination or lynching of Alemán.94 It may have been tried. On August 3, 1948, the US ambassador was told that the Alamillo Flores group was planning to assassinate the president; elite airmen from Squadron 201, Mexico’s only veterans of World War II, joked very publicly about just that. On August 11, strong and widespread rumors ran from Mexico City to Veracruz reporting that his car had been machine-gunned and his driver killed.95 Even the military yearbook, professionally noncommittal, gave some indication of backstage turbulence by demoting Alemán from the 1949 edition’s frontispiece. The president was replaced by a soldier, a flag, and the quietly suggestive “the fatherland comes first.”96 Gossip was pithier. “For Miguel’s bloody idiocy,” a spy heard one man say, “militarism is back all over us.”97

Yet the Alemán faction, and with them the PRI, held on to power with an aggressive display of force and cooption, and with the critical, grudging neutrality of ex-presidents Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho. Lacking their support, the dissident generals seem to have backed away from a quick strike in favor of turning Alemán into a puppet ruler. On August 13, a large party of generals called on Alemán, officially to assure him of their support, in reality to exert pressure for changes in the cabinet and the General Staff.98 The atmosphere as they left was one of swaggering authority; Generals Ríos Zertuche and Maurilio Rodríguez had called the president “tu,” enjoyed his panic, and believed that they would get “all they wanted” from Alemán, including five generals in the cabinet.99 Various sources suggested that a deal had been struck, and that the presidential informe,
a state of the union address, would deliver a drastic reshuffle to purge both Alemanista civilians and Secretary of Defense Gilberto Limón. This would probably have been the first of an open-ended series of capitulations: Alemán’s fate was, according to both the US embassy and some Mexican intelligence briefs, in the hands of the army. By the time of the informe, however, he had partly defused the situation by winning the public support of the unions and by increasing the supply of affordable food in Mexico City and provincial capitals. Alemán then gambled that the moment for a coup had passed and kept his cabinet unchanged, facing the army down. Cárdenas had allegedly given the president until the middle of September to improve his administration; diplomats noted that neither Cárdenas nor Ávila Camacho turned up to the much-publicized “unity dinner” that the military offered Alemán on September 3; Cárdenas was believed to be under constant surveillance by gobernación spies. The autumn remained a tense time.

Alemán may have delivered part of a deal in November, when he fired the loathed secretary of the national economy and dissolved the General Staff, seemingly one of the Alamillo Flores group’s demands. He certainly systematically bribed zone commanders with money from the unaudited president’s discretionary fund; conciliated other ranks (and some veterans) with land grants, houses, servants’ allowances, full-pay retirements, life insurance, and soft loans; granted a 44 percent mean wage increase, more than twice the pay rise given industrial workers in Mexico City; and maintained tight presidential control over a core of the army’s most effective units in Mexico City. At the same time, however, he purged many of the dissidents, removing Amaro from command in Oaxaca and Alamillo Flores from Colegio Militar. Many of the dissidents subsequently passed into the ranks of Henríquismo, where their failure to mount a serious military challenge to the election of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines confirmed the extent to which the military veto on presidential power had declined. Alemán was in part lucky and in large part indebted to Cárdenas and other calm voices in the army. But his eventual defiance of the generals in 1948 was also critical in consolidating the new civilian age in Mexican politics. Subsequent explicitly military parties—1949’s quasi-fascist Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), which explicitly set out to destroy (among other servants of “Stalin’s Russian Imperialism”) the “totalitarian PRI,” 1961’s Celestino Gasca rebellion—would be more or less fringe movements. Reflecting on the crisis, one diplomat realized that he had seen a turning point. “Mexico,” he reported, “has apparently outgrown the more romantic aspects of revolutionary activity as carried
on in the second decade of this century. Modern communications and modern arms and equipment have outmoded the horse, the 30–30 rifle, and the pronunciamiento [coup].”

That shift was tested in the presidential elections that bracketed it, those of 1946 and 1952. General Henríquez Guzmán was a tentative “precandidate” in 1945, backed by Mange and other officers; he never became a declared rival because of Cárdenas’s swaying of the army and Ávila Camacho’s purge and reshuffle. (Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho broadly represented the left and the right of the army, respectively.) The first election of a civilian candidate was not, however, completely smooth, and supporters of Alemán’s defeated PRIísta rival, Ezequiel Padilla, launched an abortive rebellion in the highlands of Guerrero. In 1951, Henríquez Guzmán left the PRI and became the candidate of the Federación de Partidos del Pueblo Mexicano (FPPM, Federation of Parties of the Mexican People), a vehicle for three diverse groups: political outcasts of all stripes, Cardenistas, and militarists. Ex-governor Berber of Guerrero, a political untouchable, was a regional leader; Francisco Múgica, Genovevo de la O, and Rubén Jaramillo were prominent; 1948 militarist leaders generals Antonio Ríos Zertuche and Luis Alamillo Flores were too. The Henriquista campaign was never genuinely national, and Cárdenas refused to commit himself publicly to its support. It was, however, powerful in Mexico City and several states, caused fears of risings on election day and in the run-up to the inauguration, and was met with intense repression. The army in Mexico City backed the government as it faced down numerous crowds: on November 16, for example, spies estimated twenty-five thousand Henriquistas in a demonstration. Henriquismo ended up an anti-climax, but a landmark in military/civil relations. Conceptualized in part as a classic Latin American militarist movement, patriotically correcting the corruption of civilian rule, it ended up underlining the domination of the early PRI and affording another opportunity to purge some of the most threatening or geriatric officers. In its aftermath, Alemán created seventy-six new generals and sixty-six colonels. After the first year or so of the Ruiz Cortines sexenio, Mexico’s peculiar brand of authoritarianism was quite well established—peculiar, in part, for an army far smaller than those of Latin America’s later bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

Yet this contested demilitarization implied both hidden costs and striking ambiguities. Across the 1940s and early 1950s, the first PRIístas and key ex-presidents reached a clearly defined modus vivendi with the armed forces, a tacit pact that ceded considerable regional and institutional autonomy to the generals in partial exchange for increased, but not wholesale,
General Mange’s Command in Veracruz

national submissiveness. This pact was not merely implied: formal, institutional arrangements—the foundations of earlier, “cost-free demilitarization” arguments—clearly reflected its terms. After 1946, there would be no more military presidents; a direct line from the armed forces to the highest level of power was preserved, on the other hand, in the four generals who headed the PRI over the next two decades.114 Miguel Alemán relied on no less than fifteen generals as governors over his term; in Frank Brandenburg’s analysis, the military zone commanders of the 1950s and 1960s held more regional power than all bar a handful of the most important governors, civilian caciques, and bureaucrats.115 Meanwhile, the regime gave those divisional generals too powerful to ignore a whole new level of formal power. In April 1951, a territorial reorganization of the army created ten new regiones militares, each one grouping several zonas militares. The list of those regional commanders constituted a who’s who of deeply political soldiers—several ex-governors, at least one possible presidenciable, a future defense secretary—several of whom had built cacicazgos in real or adopted patrias chicas (little fatherlands).116 Rodrigo Quevedo and his family had controlled the critical posts in the Chihuahua state administration across the 1930s, pledging, gossip had it, “to develop the state of Chihuahua with gambling, whores and vice”; Bonifacio Salinas Leal had been the strongman of Nuevo León.117 These two, at least, had been at the center of the military’s recent steps toward retaking national power: gobernación spies had watched closely as they organized a would-be secret junta in autumn 1948.118 They may have been being paid off; they may have been making comebacks. They were clearly participants in a quid pro quo, and they did not retire from politics.119 Salinas Leal, for example, interfered in both the 1958 presidential succession and the 1960 naming of a new chief of staff.120 In 1970, he became a senator; a 1973 report had him plotting to topple the incumbent chief of staff, running a private intelligence service using taxi drivers, and allegedly preparing a group of agents provocateurs to destabilize President Luis Echeverría with a further student massacre. Despite this, he stayed on active service until his death at age eighty-two.121 Yet nobody, perhaps, did as well as Alejandro Mange, for he kept hold of Veracruz.

Everyday demilitarization in the Mexican provinces was thus partial. Top commanders lost some autonomy, but gained new territories. They exercised less violence, but maintained significant businesses—businesses backed, in the last analysis, by force or the threat of force. Their remaining autonomy made it something more than a straightforward Tocquevillian exchange of political for economic power.122 Indicators of continuing
independence are not hard to find. Mange’s mere survival on active service was one of them. Divisional generals were supposed to retire at sixty-five, an age Mange reached in 1950. In May, Secretary of Defense Limón ordered his retirement; Mange, however, refused to provide the army with proofs of his age and subsequently had his retirement suspended by presidential decree. Far from collecting a pension, in August 1950 he collected a medal for *perseverancia* (length of service). In January 1951, General Limón tried to pension Mange off once more, ordering forcible retirement; he was instead promoted to head the new Second Military Region, headquartered in Veracruz. This continuity in the same command was itself another indicator of independence: it went directly against the policy (designed in the late nineteenth century) of what the army yearbook called “rotation in command . . . to give new elements a chance and to avoid prejudicial settling down.” The new president—Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, another Veracruzano—seems to have continued backing Mange, who was not retired until Adolfo López Mateos began his term in 1959. Admittedly sparse anecdotal evidence from the 1950s points to continuing cacical practices. During the 1952 presidential election, Mange summarily arrested his old enemy, General Cándido Aguilar, and reportedly had to be prevented from summarily killing him. During his 1959 retirement negotiations (dubbed “muy urgente” by the Secretariat of National Defense) he asked that his 100 percent salary and $68,000 retirement bonus be supplemented with the grant of two aides, one of them suggestively named César Mange. He was, according to one report, disenchanted enough with the final settlement to discuss rebellion with the Colonna brothers, old gunman friends from the south. When it came to the imperatives of old age, Alejandro Mange did not go gentle anywhere at all, raging instead over how “le quitaron la chichi.”

General Mange’s Veracruz cacicazgo offers an illuminating case study in military autonomy. The general powerfully influenced life in Veracruz, first as zone and later as regional commander, for twenty-two years. Whether this was due to (perhaps literally) knowing where the bodies were buried during two Veracruzano presidencies or whether it reflected his ability to maintain some control at any cost remains an open question. It baffled contemporary observers, who stressed his personal empire-building, corruption, and subversion of local government. His power in the late 1930s and early 1940s, when he and a network of violent agrocapitalists ruled much of Veracruz and tried to veto the party’s pick for the presidency, was admittedly extraordinary. Yet the intense focus on rebellion, formal budgets, and the power to select presidents that underpins Lieuwen’s
pathfinding analysis should not conceal the partial, pacted, Faustian quality of Mexican demilitarization. Mange did preserve his command and the wealth it brought him. He preserved, according to one (scandalous but signed) denunciation, his business relationship with criminals such as the cattle rustlers of southern Veracruz. He was straightforwardly unfirable: when the secretary of defense tried to forcibly retire the aging general, the president overrode the decision and promoted him instead. One of the last entries in the general’s personnel file is a complaint from the Ferrocarriles Nacional de México, dated March 31, 1959. Railway engineers investigating a train crash between Chacaltianguis and Cocuite traced it to gravel on the line. The gravel came from a road that Mange’s troops were busily constructing “to the benefit of the aforementioned soldier’s personal properties”; it caused $3,110 worth of damage. We know more about the costs of this (literal) crossroads than we do about the cost of the (metaphorical) crossroads where military and civilian power intersected in Mexican state formation. More research is needed. For now, though, it seems likely that the autonomy and enduring power of Alejandro Mange will not prove a lone case; and that such generals, filing reluctantly out of the palace, clung to their power to derail local societies across the supposed heyday of PRIista Mexico.

Notes

Author’s note: I use the following abbreviations in the notes: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN); Archivo Histórico del Estado de Veracruz (AHEV); Archivo Histórico Plutarco Elías Calles (AHPEC); Carmen Blázquez Domínguez, Estado de Veracruz: Informes de sus gobernadores, 1826–1986, 22 vols. (Xalapa: Gobierno del estado de Veracruz, 1986) (BD); Dirección General de Gobierno (DGG); Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS); British Foreign Office (FO) 3071; Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Presidente Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR); Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Presidente Manuel Avila Camacho (MAC); Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Presidente Miguel Alemán Valdés (MAV); Manuel Ríos Thivol (MRT); National Archives Record Group (NARG); Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SDN).

1. A high-quality exception to this generalization is provided by Thom Rath’s recent dissertation. Thomas Rath, “Army, State and Nation in Mexico, 1920–1958” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2009).


4. Rath suggests that this was a public relations coup, as many of the announced retirements may not have happened in reality. Rath, “Army, State and Nation in Mexico,” 78–79; Ávila Camacho decree of 3 December 1945, reproduced in Instituto de Capacitación Política (PRI), Historia documental del Partido de la Revolución (Mexico City: Partido de la Revolución Institucional, Instituto de Capacitación Política, 1982), 5:173–75; Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 144.

5. Excélsior, 1 October 1951.


7. And this was in 1976, before Costa Rica’s dramatic expansion of her security services in the early 1980s. In 1976, Mexican military expenditure was 0.6 percent of GDP, or in relative terms, half that of Brazil, a quarter that of Argentina, and an eighth that of Great Britain. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 74–77. On the exaggerated image of Costa Rican demilitarization, see James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America (London: Verso, 1988), 640–44.


10. The long coastal sweep of Veracruz was divided between two zones: the Twenty-sixth, covering central and southern Veracruz, and the Nineteenth, covering Tuxpan, the northern oilfields, and the Huasteca.

11. SEDENA disposition of forces, 1 September 1948, AGN/MAV-550/19.

12. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 445.

13. The officers stretched from the deeply conservative Mange to the Zapatistas Adrián Castrejón and Manuel Palafox.


16. Caciquismo is a concept that has colonized many of the social sciences when they turn to Mexico—and other places, such as Russia—and generated an appreciable literature. Critical works of the anthropologists, sociologists, and revisionist and neo-populist historians who have explored the phenomenon include Paul Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village (Englewood Hills, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); The Princes of Naranja: An Essay in Anthrohistorical Method (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Eric Wolf, “Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies,” in Michael Banton, ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (London: Routledge, 2004), 1–22; Roger Bartra, Caciquismo y poder político en el México rural (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1978); the contributors to David Brading, ed., Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Alan Knight and Wil Pansters, eds., Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2002). For a sample of the application of caciquismo to post-Soviet Russia, see Kimitaka Matsuzato, “Regional Politics and Municipal Building: The Reshuffling of

17. María López vda. de Pampín to Alemán; 1951–(?), “Información de Todo,” clipping, both in AGN/MAV-001/4232.


21. “Audacity, more audacity, always audacity,” a dictum coined, however, by Danton: a lawyer and not a soldier.


23. However, the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN, General Archive of the Nation) has received more wide-ranging records for the counterinsurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s, and the secretary of national defense, General Guillermo Galván Galván, recently promised to open the armed forces archives to “civil society.” Francisco Martín Moreno, “El archivo de la Sedena,” *Excélsior*, 18 January 2008.


25. Alejandro Mange Toyos, hoja de servicios, SDN-1-356/XI.

26. At the other extreme, Mexican strategic plans such as DN-1 have long recognized the impossibility of defending against invasion from the north. Mónica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 27 no. 2 (May 1995), 425.

27. However, he was not important enough to have his name spelled correctly. “Alejandro Monge” is listed by Lieuwen as one of four “second tier” generals (along with

I thank Ben Fallaw for bringing this to my attention.

28. Alejandro Mange Toyos, hoja de servicios, SDN-1-356/XI.
29. Raleigh A. Gibson to State, 17 May 1943, NARG-812.00/32150.
31. Agente del Ministerio Público Mérida to Procurador de Justicia Militar México DF, 7 July 1922, SDN-1-356/XII, AMP.
34. Campeche Congress to XXIX Legislatura, 6 July 1921, *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados XXIX Legislatura*, I:115; Enrique Najera to Calles, 28 April 1924, AHPEC-55/7/8932/1; Tejeda to Amaro, 17 December 1926, AGN/DGIPS-106/135(S5)6; Arriola to Campos Gómez, 11 June 1940, AGN/DGIPS-87/2; Parra to Cárdenas, 9 August 1940, AGN/LCR-542.1/211; “Actividades reaccionarias en el estado de Veracruz,” 4 October 1939, AGN/DGIPS-140/9.
39. Assorted correspondence, SDN-1-356/VI, XI.
41. Migoni to Gobernación, 9 August 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1; *Diario de Xalapa*, 23 August 1948.
44. *La Prensa*, 7 October 1948.
46. Borges Ortiz to Rodríguez, 29/10/1934, AGN/DGG-2/012.2(26)/137/68/37; Migoni to Gobernación, 24/08/1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/45/282; *Diario de Xalapa*, 18 July 1945.
47. Gobernación to Vázquez Vela, 27 March 1935, AGN/LCR-541/411.
48. PS-7 to Gobernación, 15 January 1943, AGN/DGIPS-776/1; Gómez Galeana to Alemán, 25 March 1947, AGN/DGIPS-12/2/389(9)38.
49. See, for example, Ramos to Avila Camacho, 20 June 1944, AGN/MAC-542.1/579.
52. La Verdad, 7 May 1949; Alvarado to Martínez, 15 May 1941, AGN/MAC-542.1/269; PS-31, 34, 43 to Gobernación, 28 April 1949, AGN/DGIPS-84/MRT; Presidente municipal Acapulco to SEDENA, 21 June 1930, SDN-1-398/XVI.
53. PS-31 to Gobernación, 29 August 1949, AGN/DGIPS-84/MRT.
54. Flores to Gobernación, 6 December 1952, AGN/DGG-2.311M(9)155/2B.
55. Diario de Xalapa, 14 April 1945; circular, Ramos to defensas rurales, 5 November 1943, AGN/MAC-542.1/579.
57. Diario de Xalapa, 23 May 1945; 5 June 1952.
60. Diario de Xalapa, 6 June 1952.
62. See, for example, Terrence E. Poppa, Drug Lord: The Life & Death of a Mexican Kingpin: A True Story (El Paso, TX: Cinco Puntos Press, 2010), 73, 111, 301–2.
63. Amorós to Ruiz Cottines, 6 August 1945, AGN/MAC-542.1/891; Migoni to Gobernación, 10 October 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/45/282.
64. Ojeda to Gobernación, 10 December 1948; AGN/DGG-2.311M(9)/3B/6.
66. Vecinos de Chihuitán, Tehuantepec, Oax., to SEDENA, undated, SDN-1-356/VII.
67. Sergeants Hernández Espinosa and Bailón Segundo to Alemán, 7 April 1947, AGN/MAV-556.63/26. This practice continued across the rest of the century; see, for example, the corruption charges, trial, and nine-year imprisonment of high-ranking whistleblower Brigadier General José Francisco Gallardo Rodríguez in 1993. Gallardo Rodríguez had published excerpts from his master’s thesis, “The Need for a Military Ombudsman in Mexico,” La Jornada, 12 March 1998.
69. Diario de Xalapa, 28 March 1945.
70. “Situation política estado de Chiapas,” 23 September 1940, AGN/DGIPS-83/10; La Prensa, 7 October 1948.
71. Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México to SEDENA, 31 March 1959, SDN-1-356/XII; Migoni to Gobernación, 10 October 1945.
72. Garate to Ávila Camacho, 31 March 1946, AHEV-1360/166/1(179).
73. Presidente municipal Chicomepec to Alemán, 8 March 1948, AGN/MAV-542.1/592; Bautista to Alemán, 15 May 1948, AGN/MAV-540.1/15.


78. Assorted correspondence, SDN-1-356/VI; Santoyo, La Mano Negra, 131.

79. Tejeda to Amaro, 17 December 1926, AGN/DGIPS-106/135(S5)6; Arriola to Campos Gómez, 11 June 1940, AGN/DGIPS-87/2; Parra to Cárdenas, 9 August 1940, AGN/LCR-542.1/211; “Actividades reaccionarias en el estado de Veracruz,” 4 October 1939, AGN/DGIPS-140/9.

80. PS-50 to Gobernación, 26 June 1940, AGN/DGIPS-87/2.


82. Diario de Xalapa, 1, 2, 3 July 1945.

83. PS-1 & PS-18 to Gobernación, 2 May 1945, AGN/DGIPS-88/Carlos Saavedra.

84. Migoni to Gobernación, 14, 15, 21 June 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/45/282; López vda de Pamín to Alemán, s.f., AGN/MAV-001/423.

85. Migoni to Gobernación, 10 October 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/457282.

86. Pérez to SEDENA, 7 January 1959, SDN-1-356/XII; Migoni to Gobernación, 23 June, 10, 19 October 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/45/282; Migoni to Gobernación, 6 June 1946, AGN/DGIPS-791/2-1/46/405; Amorós to Ruiz Cortines, 6 August 1945, AGN/MAC-542.1/891; López vda de Pamín to Alemán, s.f., AGN/MAV-001/423.

87. Migoni to Gobernación, 10, 19 October 1945, AGN/DGIPS-787/2-1/45/282.


90. There were no dollar sellers at the official rate of 6.70. Pavón Silva to Gobernación, 2 August 1948, AGN/DGIPS-111/2-1/260/82. For popular predictions of a violent end to the regime, see DGIPS director Lamberto Ortega Peregrina’s intelligence summaries in AGN/DGIPS-111/2-1/260/82.

91. Nuevo Laredo Consulate to Secretary of State, 7 October 1948, NARG-812.00/10-748.


94. Assorted reports, 22 July to 30 August, AGN/DGIPS-111/2-1/260/82.


98. Rapp to Bevin, 19 August 1948, FO 371/67994.


100. Thurston to Secretary of State, 5, 20 August 1948, NARG-812.00/8-548, 8-2048; memorandum, 23 August 1948, AGN/DGIPS-24/3.

101. He was rumored to have responded by dismissing his bodyguard and moving his bed out onto the patio for better visibility. Speaks to ambassador, 3/08/1948, NARG-812.00/8-548; Turkel, memorandum, 1 October 1948, NARG-812.00/10-848.


104. La Prensa, 22 October 1948.

105. Gasca’s call to arms to the remnants of the Federación de Partidos del Pueblo Mexicano (FPPM, Federation of Parties of the Mexican People) did mobilize rebels across seven states, kill some one hundred people, and lead to about one thousand political jailings. The rebel bands were small, however, and did not at any point seriously threaten the regime. Col. José Inclan to Governor of Veracruz, 29 November 1949, AHEV-1693/542/0; Elisa Servín, “Hacia el levantamiento armado: Del henriquismo a los federaotistas leales en los años cincuenta,” in Verónica Oikión Solano and Marta Eugenia García Ugarte, eds., Movimientos armados en México, siglo XX, 3 vols. (Michoacán: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2008), II:337–42.

106. Massey to Secretary of State, 20 October 1948, NARG-812.00/10-2048.

107. Codoner to State Department, July 1945, NARG-812.00/Guerrero/7-3145; Third Secretary Massey to State Department, 28 September 1948, NARG-812.00/9-2848; PS-19 to Gobernación, 3 August 1945, AGN/DGIPS-132/2-1/302.4(0.11)/2; Gillingham, “Force and Consent,” 56–57.

108. Carlos Martínez Assad, El Henriquismo, una piedra en el camino (Mexico City: Martín Casillas Editores, 1982), 19.

109. For an example of abject failure, see the history of henriquismo in Guerrero. Assorted reports, January–June 1952, AGN/DFS-Guerrero-100-10-14-51H194L4,

110. The concern of the government and the endurance of strong support for Héctor Guzmán past July 1952 have been underestimated. See the reports of the six inspectors assigned to the case in AGN/DGIPS-104/2-1/131/1062.

111. Reports, 16 November 1952, AGN/DGIPS-104/2-1/131/1062.


113. In the early 1950s, Mexico’s military absorbed some 0.6 percent of the GDP and consisted of 2.1 armed forces members per 1,000 population. In the heyday of bureaucratic authoritarianism, Argentina’s military spent 3.6 percent of GDP and numbered 5.6 soldiers per 1,000 population; Chile spent 3.6 percent of GDP and numbered 10.5 soldiers per 1,000 population. INEGI, Estadísticas históricas de México CD-ROM (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2000); Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 73–74.


116. This reorganization and these officers—namely Pablo Macías Valenzuela, Leobardo Ruiz Camarillo, Agustín Mustiales Medel, Bonifacio Salinas Leal, Juan Izaguirre Payan, Teófilo Alvarez Borboa, Rodrigo Quevedo Moreno, Matías Ramos Santos, and Alejandro Mange Toyos—are the subject of a current research project. Cuartel General to Comdt 119 regto, 5 April 1951, SDN-1-356/X-2325.

117. López to Daniels, 5 March 1934, NARG-812.114 narcotics/370 roll 34.

118. Región militar commands were not the only institutional means of pacifying politically ambitious young generals. In a deeply Tocquevillian transaction, Luis Alamillo Flores, the leader of one of those juntas, was removed from Colegio Militar and given control of a seventy-million-peso budget as head of the National Diesel Motor Factory. Memoranda, 27 September, 25 October 1948, AGN/DGIPS-24/3; [La Prensa], 6 September 1948; El Universal, 30 January 1952.

119. The interpretation that postings to regiones militares constituted an incentive to acquiescence in civilian rule is reinforced by some subsequent appointments. Miguel Z. Martínez, for example, was one of the powerful generals at the heart of the 1948 juntas; in 1952 he was given command of the Tenth Region Militar. La Prensa, 6 September 1948; El Universal, 30 January 1952.

120. RPTE-XA 1 to “Mi General,” telegram, 5 October 1956, SDN-P/111/1-109; anonymous to “Mi Mayor,” telegram, 9 February 1960, SDN-P/111/1-109.


123. Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 119.


128. Departamento del retiro y pensiones to departamento de hojas y servicio, 9 May 1959, SDN-1-356/XII.
129. Corzo Ramírez et al., . . . nunca un desleal, 328.
130. Dir. General de justicia to Jefe del departamento de Archivos, 9 May 1959, SDN-1-356/XII/2798; Dir. general de personal to comandante de la 1a zona militar, 7 August 1959, XII/2804; Mange to SEDENA, 29 December 1958, SDN-1-356/XII/2856; Pérez to SEDENA, 7 January 1959, SDN-1-356/XII.
131. Pérez to SEDENA, 7 January 1959, SDN-1-356/XII.
132. General Alejandro Mange Toyos, hoja de servicios, SDN-1-356/XI.
133. According to the FBI, Alemán was rumoured to have left some forty-five bodies behind him in his political ascent. Alejandro Quintana, “With a Gun in His Hand”: Maximino Avila Camacho and the 1941 Challenge to Presidentialism” (presentation, American Historical Association Meeting, 2007), 30.
134. López vda de Pampín to Alemán, 1950, AGN/MAV-001/4232.
135. Pérez to SEDENA, 7 January 1959, SDN-1-356/XII.
137. Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México to SEDENA, 31 March 1959, SDN-1-356/XII.
138. That power was reinvigorated in the 1990s. As Ferreyra and Segura argue, “While the military has contributed to a consolidation of democratic transformations at the national level, it has acted against it in the local sphere.” Ferreyra and Segura, “Examining the Military in the Local Sphere,” 19, 32–33.